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Abstract 
Colombia is currently the world’s largest producer of coca leaf and the principal producer of 
opium poppies in the Americas; the plants are the basic raw materials used to produce 
cocaine and heroin. This document analyses the current relationship between these crops and 
illegal armed groups in Colombia, using the hypothesis that the geographical intensification 
of the conflict is the principal cause of expanding illicit crop production. This relationship 
was analysed using a theoretical model, in which an interaction between illegal armed 
activity and strategic territorial control lead to cocaine production. Spatial analysis 
techniques were then applied, especially spatial association indicators; and a clear spatial 
dynamic was observed, related to the two aspects mentioned above. Non-parametric exercises 
were also carried out using matching estimators, to determine the effect illegal armed groups 
have on coca crops, and also to analyse the efficiency of aerial eradication policies. The 
results suggest that a large percentage of coca production in Colombia is due to the effects of 
illegal armed activity. We therefore conclude that the expansion of illegal crop growing is a 
consequence of the expanding conflict. In contrast, coca crops can only be used to explain a 
small part of the armed conflict in Colombia. In addition, we found that crop eradication via 
aerial spraying has not been an efficient tool in the fight against coca production in the 
country. 
 
 
Introduction 
Colombia has become the world’s largest producer of coca leaf and the main producer of 
opium poppies in the Americas; these plants are the basic raw materials used to produce 
cocaine and heroin. The nineties were characterised by an expansion of coca growing in the 
order of 286 percent (cultivated hectares increased from 37,500 in 1992 to 144,807 in 2001). 
This expansion was accompanied by reduced cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. Various 
different social sciences have studied this phenomenon, most focusing on the causes and 
consequences, with little empirical or quantitative evidence. Evidence exists that coca and 
opium crops are closely linked to the finances of illegal armed groups, which is in line with 
recent literature regarding internal conflicts and civil wars. A lack of external funding leads 
the irregular groups towards an economic activity in which they have the competitive edge. In 
most cases, this activity is based on economic depredation or extortion – particularly of 
primary goods – via the selective or indiscriminate use of violence.1 They are also, of course, 
involved in monetary extortion and kidnapping, in which the use of intense violence is 
employed.  
 
The irregular groups’ objective to dominate and control coca and opium poppy growing areas 
has lead to the intimidation of local communities, and the use of violence against them. 
                                                 
1 Ian Bannon & Paul, Collier, ‘Natural Resources and Conflict: What We Can do’, in Ian Bannon & Paul Collier 
(eds), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 
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However, coca and poppy crops are not a depredatory activity per se. There is a certain added 
value to their production; there is a market for the product, in which the irregular groups 
intervene; and they are the basic raw materials of psychoactive drugs. Nevertheless, 
geographical expansion goes beyond these economic factors. The illegal groups’ strategic 
objectives regarding territorial control also play an important role here. In recent years the 
evidence has suggested a growing link between the expansion of illegal crops2 and the 
activities of the armed groups, to the extent that profits from coca and poppy production, in 
addition to those generated by the production of psychoactive drugs, have become one of the 
main ways that these groups finance their activities. Therefore, this paper analyses the above 
mentioned relationship, with the hypothesis that the geographical expansion and 
intensification of the conflict is the principal cause behind the expansion of illegal crops. To 
verify the hypothesis patterns of spatial diffusion and contagion between coca production and 
the activities of illegal armed groups were analysed using current spatial analysis techniques. 
A theoretical model of the illicit crops/conflict relationship was also developed to reach a 
better understanding of its dynamics and interrelations. Furthermore, in order to analyse the 
empirical causality relationship between illicit crops and the conflict, the level of illegal 
armed activity in coca growing areas in municipalities or regions was studied using the non-
parametric method known as matching estimators. 
 
This paper is divided into six sections. The first is an analysis of coca trends in the Andean 
region, and how they have been interpreted by different authors. The second section offers a 
brief history of coca, and recent trends in the Andean region. The third is a description of coca 
trends in Colombia and regional dynamics over recent years, as well as a brief mention of the 
principal interpretations and hypotheses of the causes and consequences of illicit crop 
growing in Colombia. The fourth section develops the theoretic model and tries to explain the 
relationship between illegal crops and the conflict. The fifth section relates coca geography 
with that of the internal conflict in Colombia, by using spatial analysis techniques, in 
particular related to the clusters and dynamics of illicit crop diffusion, and reviews the impact 
of eradication efforts. The sixth section presents an econometric analysis of the effects of the 
armed conflict on the number of cultivated hectares and vice versa. Finally, we present our 
conclusions in the last section. 
 
 
Interpreting Coca Trends in the Andean Region 
Coca is native to the Andean Region (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia). Its cultivation and 
consumption (as leaf) has long been part of the traditions and customs of Andean peasant 
farmers, above all in Bolivia and Peru. In recent decades, specifically since international 
demand for drugs began to increase, this region has become the world’s leading producer of 
coca: 200,000 hectares of coca are under cultivation in this part of the world. The cultivated 
area in these three countries was stable throughout the nineties. But in recent years the 
proportion of the total grown in each country has changed substantially. Colombia went from 
being an importer of coca base to being a net producer of coca leaf – from 19 percent of total 
regional cultivation in 1990 to 72 percent in 2001. Over the same period Peru’s share fell 
from 57 percent to 17 percent, and Bolivia’s from 25 percent to 10 percent.3  
                                                 
2 The cultivation of plants such as coca, opium poppies and marijuana, that are processed into natural 
psychoactive drugs. Coca grows in warm, humid zones with high rainfall, which are between 300 and 1,600m 
above sea level. Opium poppies, on the other hand, thrive in mountainous areas between 1,800 and 3,000m 
above sea level. 
3 In the international environment, it is believed that drug income is a fundamental part of development in the 
Andean countries (see Francisco E. Thoumi, El Imperio de la Droga: Narcotráfico, economía y sociedad en Los 
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This relocation of coca production in the region (Graph 1) was the result of successful 
eradication and interdiction efforts in Bolivia and Peru. Although these policies enjoyed 
domestic success, they did not have the same results at regional level. Reduced production in 
these two countries was compensated for by new crops in Colombia. 
 
Graph 1. Coca Production in the Andean Region 1990-2001 
                        
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
H
ec
ta
re
s
Bolivia Colombia Perú
  
                              Source: US State Department 
 
Each country has used a different strategy to reduce the supply of coca. Bolivia favoured 
eradication, Peru placed greater importance on fighting trafficking (shutting down aerial and 
fluvial export routes and thus inspiring the abandonment of cultivated land), and Colombia 
has favoured chemical fumigation, eradication and crop substitution.  
 
Although the Andean region is the principal world supplier of cocaine, it is also produced in 
parts of Africa, Asia, some areas of the USA (Hawaii), Guam and Latin America (Brazil, 
Ecuador, the Guyanas and Venezuela).There follows a brief history of coca production in 
Bolivia, Peru and, specifically, Colombia.  
 
 
Bolivia  
Between 1720 and 1950 Bolivian coca was grown mainly in the Yungas region, in the 
Department of La Paz. It was a legal activity and coca was a principal part of the Bolivian 
diet.4 During the 1950s, Chapare, in the Department of Cochabamba, began to overtake 
Yungas due to the productive advantages of this region, 5 becoming the leading producer in 
the 1960s and 70s.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Andes,  Bogotá, Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2002; and Roberto Steiner, ‘Los Dólares del Narcotráfico’, 
Cuadernos de  Fedesarrollo , 2, Bogotá: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 1997). However, investigations based on 
rigorous calculations have shown that cocaine income is just 3.4 percent of Peruvian GDP, less than 5 percent of 
Bolivian GDP and around 5 percent of Colombian GDP. Today it is 3 percent of Colombian GDP, whilst in the 
first half of the 1980s it was 7 percent of GDP. This shows that other sectors exist in these countries that offer 
better economic growth perspectives than the coca business.   
4 Thoumi (2002). 
5 These natural advantages are that coca can be produced without a need for terracing, and that plants may be 
harvested four times a year instead of three, as is the case in Yungas. Furthermore, Chapare coca contains more 
alkaloids than Yunga coca, and processing costs are therefore lower. 
  
4
Until the end of the 1960s, the evolution of coca in Bolivia was fairly stable. However, high 
profits and sustained increases in international demand for coca, in addition to the Bolivian 
economic crisis in the 1980s and the closure of tin mines in 1985, led to a rise in illegal coca 
cultivation. An operational structure was consolidated during these years that facilitated the 
transition from the first phase of production to the cocaine business itself, although the final 
stage of production – the fabrication of cocaine hydrochloride – was controlled by the 
Colombian cartels.6 
 
The coca situation in Bolivia today is very different to the sustained growth of the 1980s. In 
1987 there were 60,000 hectares of coca being cultivated in Bolivia, which supplied a large 
proportion of international demand (Graph 2). During subsequent years production remained 
stable at around 50,000 hectares. However, the effect of government programmes7 designed 
to fight illicit production led to a fall in production that sharpened from 1997 when Plan 
Dignidad (the Dignity Plan) came into force.8 The programme, supported by the US 
government, aimed to reduce supply to the minimum level needed to satisfy domestic demand 
for coca leaf. Since 1997 coca production in Bolivia has fallen significantly; it currently 
makes a marginal contribution to the global market.  
 
Graph 2. Coca production in Bolivia from 1980 to 2001 
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                                  Source: US State Department 
 
 
                                                 
6 Fernando Rojas, La Economía de la Coca, La Paz: Instituto de Investigación Socio-Económicas, Universidad 
Católica Boliviana, 2002. 
7 Law 1008 (1988), regulated production, distribution and commercialisation and offered alternative 
development sources. It also defined legal production zones. Amongst other programmes are the: Estrategia 
Nacional de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico (the National Drug War Strategy) and the Estrategia Nacional de 
Desarrollo Alternativo (Opción Cero)  (National Alternative Development Strategy (Zero Option)), that focussed 
on offering monetary compensation for each hectare of coca eradicated, substituting illegal crops for legal 
alternatives, as well as eradication and interdiction. 
8 This plan is known as the Estrategia Boliviana de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico (Bolivian Drug War Strategy) 
and is based on four aspects: a) alternative development, b) prevention and rehabilitation, c) the eradication of 
illegal coca, and d) interdiction. International aid to the value of $952 million over five years was used by the 
Bolivian government to implement and continue the plan; $108 million (11 percent) were spent on eradicating 
coca crops, and $700 million (73 percent) on alternative development, which was based on the five 
commercially viable crops: banana, pineapple, oil palm, maracuya (a variety of passion fruit) and black pepper. 
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Peru 
Coca has been grown in Peru for millennia; it has played a central role in Peruvian social 
customs throughout the country’s history. 9 Initially, legal crops were established in the area 
known as Ceja de la Selva to satisfy a domestic demand for the product of around 1,000 
cultivated hectares.10 The poor state of the Peruvian economy in the 1950s (agricultural 
recession, population growth and a weakened mining sector) inspired the successive non-
structured colonization of the Alto Huallaga valley. 11 This region is ideal for coca cultivation 
due to its environmental and geographical characteristics, in addition to its proximity to 
Colombia and its poor access routes. These conditions, combined with growing international 
demand for drugs and an increase in drug-trafficking, led to the exponential growth of 
cultivated hectares of coca in Peru during the 1980s and 90s, which became known as the 
boom de la coca. 
 
This increase in coca leaf production not only generated higher exports of coca paste to 
Colombia, it also became a source of financing for the guerrilla forces that established 
themselves in coca growing regions.12 At the start of the 1980s, the Sendero Luminoso and 
MRTA guerrilla groups took control of the Alto Huallaga valley and began regulating prices; 
they became the intermediaries between peasant farmers and drug-traffickers.13  
 
Peru became the world’s largest producer of coca – going from 18,000 cultivated hectares in 
1969 to 129,000 in 1992. Coca growing also expanded to 16 new areas including the central 
jungle and valley of Apurímac. However, the evolution of coca growing in Peru appeared to 
have reached the end of its expansion. From the second half of the 1990s, production in Peru 
began to fall, reaching 34,000 hectares in 2001 (see Graph 3). 
 
Graph 3. Coca production in Peru 1989-2001 
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                                Source: US State Department 
 
                                                 
9 Coca was considered by the Incas to be a ‘sacred leaf’ and its consumption was limited to the governing and 
religious classes. Ritual use is still the principal motivation for chewing coca leaf in Peru. 
10 José E. Gonzáles, Perú: Sendero Luminoso en el Valle de la Coca en Coca, Cocaína y Narcotráfico, in Diego 
García Sayán, Coca, Cocaina y Narcotráfico: Laberinto en los Andes, Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989. 
11 This valley straddles the north of the Department of Huanuco and the south of the Department of San Martín, 
450 km north-east of Lima. 
12 Cynthya McClintock, ‘The war on Drugs: the Peruvian Case’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs, 30 (1998). 
13 Enrique Obando, ‘El narcotráfico en el Perú: una aproximación histórica’, Análisis Internacional, 2 (April-
June 1993). 
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This accelerated reduction can be explained in terms of the successful policies designed to 
control production and commercialisation such as: eradication using toxic herbicides, aerial 
control (the destruction of the air lift with Colombia in 1995), the “el gringo” fungus and the 
defeat of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group. Currently, an internationally funded project 
called the Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo de Prevención y Rehabilitación (Programme 
for Alternative Development via Prevention and Rehabilitation) is in place in Peru. Its chief 
objective is to substitute illicit crops for legal agricultural systems. 
 
Coca Production in Colombia 
A Brief History 
During the 1960s Colombia became a producer and exporter of marijuana, which was grown 
in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the Serranía del Perijá14. However, the illegal 
industry’s zenith was not to last due to manual eradication campaigns, confiscation of boats 
and planes, the destruction of equipment used to process narcotics and, principally, the 
increased supply of Californian marijuana. Nowadays, marijuana is grown almost exclusively 
for domestic consumption. Although some exports to the USA have been detected, they are 
far lower than during the 1970s.15 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s the bonanza coquera (coca bonanza) 
began. The traffickers began by importing coca base from Bolivia and Peru, and processed it 
into cocaine in Colombia for re-exportation to the USA. 16  High profits enabled the business 
to rapidly become self- financing. At the same time, Colombia began to consolidate domestic 
coca production, and crops were established in areas far from the economic centres of the 
country (principally the Departments of Caquetá, Guaviare and Putumayo). 
 
Colombia’s increased participation in the global drug market led to the strengthening of drug 
trafficking and the consolidation of the industry (still using imported coca base from Peru and 
Bolivia). Large scale drug trafficking offered huge earnings and led to the formation of the 
Medellin, Cali and Caribbean Coast Cartels, who promoted the vertical integration of all 
stages of production; from growing the plants, supplying the precursors, processing, 
production and transport, to domestically and internationally commercialising the product via 
appropriate distribution networks. Equally, money laundering mechanisms and processes 
were created. 
 
As the drug cartels consolidated their control, urban homicide rose (especially in Medellin 
and Cali) and the judicial system began to deteriorate (evidenced by rising impunity).17 The 
cartels also began to openly challenge the State-via terrorist attacks and the selective 
assassination (or threatening) of political leaders-and to bribe and blackmail the different 
                                                 
14 According to Ruiz, marijuana cultivation could have reached 30,000 hectares (Hernando Ruiz, ‘Implicaciones 
sociales y económicas de la producción de marihuana’, in Marihuana: legalización o represión, Bogotá: ANIF, 
1979).  
15 Sergio Uribe, ‘Los cultivos ilícitos en Colombia’, in Drogas ilícitas en Colombia: Su impacto económico, 
político y social , Bogotá: Planeta Colombia Editorial, 1997. 
16 The process of converting coca leaf into cocaine is as follows: the leaves are mixed with a solution of kerosene 
and sodium carbonate, which extracts the alkaloid and produces what is known as coca paste. The paste is then 
treated with sulphuric acid and potassium permanganate to form cocaine base; finally the base is treated with 
ether and acetone to obtain high quality cocaine hydrochloride. 
17 Fabio Sánchez & Jairo Nuñez, ‘Determinantes del Crimen Violento en un país altamente violento: el caso de 
Colombia’, in Economía, Crimen y Conflicto, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2000; Alejandro 
Gaviria, ‘Rendimientos Crecientes y la Evolución del Crimen Violento: el Caso Colombiano’, in Economía, 
Crimen y Conflicto, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001. 
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branches of politics. The Colombian State under different governments began to strengthen 
the national police and intelligence organisations, and, with the support of the US 
government, began to persecute the cartels. The Medellin and Cali cartels were the main 
targets from 1990 to 1996, by which time most of their leaders had been killed or jailed.  
 
As the cartels got weaker, control of the cocaine business began to change hands. One part of 
the business passed into the hands of the second or third generation of cartels (Norte del 
Valle, Costa, Medellín, Eje Cafetero), and the much of the rest fell under the control of armed 
groups operating illegally (guerrillas and illegal self-defence groups). The production of coca 
and the sale of cocaine became one of the groups’ principal sources of financing.18 Drug 
trafficking has also become an important part of territorial control; it has the double function 
of offering the groups a social base (in terms of the labour force involved) and the income 
they need to escalate and expand their armed struggle. 
 
At the end of the 1980s, opium poppies began to appear on high-plains and indigenous 
reserves between 2,200 and 2,800 meters above sea level. 19 According to Ramírez, opium 
poppy growing zones are characterised by a low institutional presence, a lack of access roads 
and low coverage of State services.20 During the 1990s there was a dramatic rise in the 
number of hectares cultivated with opium poppies in the mountainous areas of the 
departments of Caquetá, Cauca, Huila, Tolima, Cesar, Cundinamarca and Boyacá.  
 
Production of opium poppies has also risen alongside the guerrilla force’s expansion; 21 and 
profits from the production and trafficking of opium poppies have also become a source of 
financing for the illegal armed groups. 
 
Recent Trends 
Colombia currently has the most problematic level of illicit crop growing in the Andean 
region. Over recent years, the country has gone from being a marginal contributor to being the 
principal world producer of coca leaf and cocaine.22 Between 1990 and 1994 it is estimated 
that around 40,000 hectares of coca were being cultivated in Colombia.23 However, in the 
second half of the decade, this area increased considerably, from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 
166,000 in 2000 (although in recent years this figure has fallen) (see Graph 4). This growth 
was due to the destruction of the air lift between Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, reduced illicit 
                                                 
18 Estimating the contribution of the drug trade to illegal groups’ coffers is a complicated exercise. It is estimated 
that 34 percent of FARC income comes from this activity (Edgar Trujillo & Martha Badel, ‘Los costos 
económicos de la criminalidad y la violencia en Colombia: 1991-1996’, Archivos Macroeconomía, DNP (March 
1998), using Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Subversión data). According to Carlos 
Castaño, commander in chief of the self-defence forces, 70 percent of this group’s income comes from drug-
trafficking. 
19 In geographical terms, Colombia is extremely suitable for opium poppy cultivation. It has one of the largest 
tropical high-plains regions in the world, that goes from 1,800 to 3,200m above sea level (María Constanza 
Ramírez, ‘l Cultivo de Amapola en Colombia’, in Consulta Técnica Internacional sobre el Cultivo Ilícito de 
Amapola en Latinoamérica, Bogotá: Ministerio de Justicia, UNDCP, 1993). 
20 Ramírez (1993). 
21 Camilo Echandía, El conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones de Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia, 
Bogotá: Presidencia de la República de Colombia Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz Observatorio de 
Violencia, 1999. 
22 Around 80 percent of world annual cocaine production (estimated at 700 tons) is produced in Colombia. 
23 Satellite information from the US State Department and the UN, complemented by National Police Drug 
Squad data. On the other hand, it is estimated that 60 percent of coca crops are on small landholdings of less than 
two hectares, managed by peasant farmers and indigenous people at subsistence level. The other 40 percent 
comes from industrial crops owned by drug traffickers. 
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production in Bolivia and Peru and enhanced demand for narcotics, all accompanied by the 
illegal groups’ need for financing. 24 
 
Graph 4. Production of coca leaf and opium poppies in Colombia 1991-2000 
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                    Source: Colombian National Police Force, Antinarcotics Division25 
 
The geographic and spatial expansion of illicit crops has been massive (see Map 1). In 1994 
these crops were only grown in a few departments and municipalities in the south of 
Colombia. Supported by the presence of illegal groups, they subsequently spread wildly 
throughout the south, south-east and south-west of the country, as well as in some important 
corridors such as Magdalena Medio (the middle Magdalena region). The three departments 
with the highest number of cultivated hectares were Putumayo (60,000), Guaviare (27,000) 
and Nariño (15,000). 
 
From 2001 the number of cultivated hectares fell considerably, reaching 102,000 in 2002.26 
The most significant reductions were in Putumayo, Meta, Cauca and Caquetá, mainly due to 
aerial spraying. Furthermore, there has been a substantial amount of voluntary eradication in 
other departments, especially Bolívar, Meta, Cauca and Vichada.  
 
This drop in cultivation has been due to the three pronged approach of the current anti-drugs 
policy: forced eradication, the systematic interdiction of the production chain and alternative 
development programmes. Aerial fumigation has been the most heavily used tool of the war 
on drugs since the end of the 70s, and its employment intensified from the mid-90s (see 
Annex, Table A1). Between 1999 and 2001, more than 195,000 hectares were fumigated – 48 
percent of this total (more than 94,000 hectares) in 2001 alone. Alternative development 
programmes, designed to substitute the coca-cocaine cycle with legal agricultural initiatives, 
have become ever more important since the National Alternative Development Plan was 
created in 1994, and again with Plan Colombia.27 
 
                                                 
24 The growth of this activity in Colombia is due to its high levels of profitability, especially in the distribution 
stage, its low agro economic cost and the trans-national nature of the business  
25 The opium poppy data comes from the second national aerial census of illicit poppy crops, October 2001. The 
2002 data comes from the US anti-drugs tsar John Waltes, ‘El 60 percent de la heroína que se consume en 
Estados Unidos proviene de Colombia’, El Tiempo (13 May 2003).   
26 SIMCI data, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (Illicit Crop Monitoring Integral System), 
using satellite analysis methodology complemented by aerial information on areas with illegal crops. The 
reliability of the results is estimated to be +/- 90 percent. 
27 By 2001, 54,551 families had benefited from this type of program (DNE). 
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Map 1. The evolution of coca crops in Colombia 1994-2001 (by municipality) 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map  
 
 
Opium poppy cult ivation has, on the other hand, remained stable at around 6,000 hectares. 
Poppies are grown in cloud forests and high-plains – regions characterised by low state 
presence, isolation and a small population, e.g. Tolima, Cauca, Nariño, Cesar and Huila. 
 
Regional Aspects 
Graph 5. Coca leaf production by region 
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                                   Source: National Drugs Department, Authors’ calculations 
 
Coca cultivation in Colombia has expanded in isolated areas of peasant colonisation, forest 
reserves, natural parks and indigenous reserves, all of which are characterised by poor 
agricultural and grazing land and precarious social conditions and infrastructure, and in which 
armed actors have played a determining role. These areas usually experience social 
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(marginality and poverty), political (armed conflict) and economic (agricultural recession) 
conflicts. 
 
78.6 percent of all coca production in Colombia is concentrated in the Orinoco and Amazon 
regions. These are areas with many forest reserves, enormous hydrological resources and the 
largest oil reserves in the country. Production in other areas is lower, but no less important; 
8.3 percent in the Pacific region, 7.6 percent in the Andean region and 5.5 percent on the 
Caribbean coast (Graph 5). 
 
1. Orinoco and Amazon Region  
The cultivation, processing and commercialisation of coca has become one of the main 
economic activities in the region. An average of 120,000 hectares were cultivated between 
1999 and 2001, specifically in the Departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, Putumayo, Meta and 
Vichada. Of the 60,000 hectares under cultivation in 1994, 36.4 percent (22,445) were in 
Guaviare, 33.6 percent (20,704) in Caquetá and 23.59 percent (14,539) in Putumayo. The 
dynamics then changed and Putumayo became the principal producer of coca with 51 percent 
(66,000) of the total. Guaviare fell to third place with 14 percent (17,619) and then regained 
its crown in 2002 with 27,000 hectares. Production in the Department of Meta has gained 
importance, mainly in the Ariari region (see Annex, Graph A1).  
 
Coca production grew dramatically in Guaviare at the end of the 1970s. Colonization of this 
region began at the end of the 19th century when timber extraction, rubber and the production 
of animal hides were the principal economic activities.28 By 1994, Guaviare was the largest 
producer of coca in the country, and aerial fumigation with glifosato began. Production fell by 
almost 5,000 hectares between 1994 and 2000 (22,445 to 17,619).29 Some growers moved on 
to Putumayo, which became the principal producer of coca in Colombia in the mid-1990s, 
although coca had existed in the Department since the 1970s. Putumayo is on the border of 
Ecuador and Peru, which facilitates the transport of contraband, the drug trade, the importing 
of precursors and  arms, and the mobilisation of the workforce from one side of the frontier to 
the other.30 The presence and activities of armed groups have become a fundamental variable 
in the consolidation of Putumayo as the principal coca region in Colombia. 
 
During the 1970s, coca crops were established in deep, well protected jungle zones.31 During 
the eighties, production was somewhat unstable due to price fluctuations, plagues and 
eradication programmes. At the start of the 1990s, Bolivian and Peruvian varieties were 
introduced and cultivation expanded rapidly to 66,000 hectares (3.21 percent of the 
                                                 
28 Alfredo Molano, Selva adentro: Una historia oral de la colonización del Guaviare, Bogotá: El Ancora 
Editores, 1987. 
29 Guaviare was the country’s largest producer of coca until 1994, when aerial spraying with glifosato began. In 
2001, 24,000 hectares were under illegal cultivation in four municipalities: Miraflores (11,777), Calamar (4,966), 
El Retorno (4,231) and San José del Guaviare (3,089 ha). It has been estimated that growers in Guaviare pick an 
average of 825 kg of coca leaf per hectare per harvest – there are 5.7 harvests a year. Annual production in 
Guaviare is, therefore, 4.7 metric tons per hectare per year (wet weight) (Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes 
(DNE), La Lucha de Colombia contra las Drogas Ilícitas: Acciones y Resultados 2001, Bogotá: Ministerio de 
Justicia y Derecho, 2001). 
30 Ricardo Vargas, Drogas, Conflicto Armado y Desarrollo Alternativo, Bogotá: Gente Nueva Editorial, 2003. 
31 María Clemencia Ramírez,  Entre el Estado y la guerrilla: Identidad y ciudadanía en el movimiento de los 
camerinos cocaleros del Putumayo, Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2001. 
  
11
department’s total surface area), spread over thirteen municipalities.32 The municipalities with 
the highest levels of cultivation were Puerto Asís, Valle del Guamés (La Hormiga), Orito, 
Puerto Guzmán and Puerto Leguizamo, each with more than 3,000 cultivated hectares (see 
Map 2). 
 
Map 2. The Evolution of Coca Crops in the Orinoco Region 1994-2001 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
In the same way as in Guaviare and Putumayo, coca crops in Caquetá increased from the mid-
1970s. The department is now the second largest producer of coca in Colombia. In 2001 
26,600 hectares were under cultivation in 15 of the department’s 16 municipalities, the most 
important being: Cartagena del Chairá (13,551), Solano (4,005), San Vicente del Caguán 
(1,713), Solita (1,170) and Valparaíso (1,240). The remaining municipalities have less than 
1,000 hectares under cultivation. 33 
 
In the Departments of Meta and Vichada, coca production has also been of some importance. 
Various armed groups are present in these departments. Increased production began in the 
mid-90s, reaching 10,000 hectares in Meta and 8,000 in Vichada in 2001. In the Departments 
of Arauca and Casanare coca growing has been of little importance. They are however 
strategic transit areas for the precursors used in the manufacture of cocaine. 
 
2. The Andean Region 
Coca production in the Andean Region is concentrated in the departments of Norte de 
Santander (70 percent of total production between 1999 and 2001), Santander (25 percent) 
                                                 
32 It is estimated that producers in Putumayo pick an average of 975 kg of coca per harvest; there are 4 harvests 
per year. Total production in the department is thus estimated to be 3.9 metric  tons (wet weight) per hectare per 
year (DNE, 2001).  
33 It is estimated that producers pick an average of 750 kg of coca per hectare per harvest; there are 5.4 harvests 
in the year. Thus the annual coca production in Caqueta is estimated to be 4.1 metric tons per hectare per year, 
(DNE, 2001). 
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and Antioquia (19 percent). Santander is a mountainous department (see Map 3) with an 
economy based around smallholdings34. It is also an important strategic transport corridor 
with the North of Colombia. All of the illegal armed groups are present in the department 
(FARC, ELN, AUC, EPL). The illegal groups are also present in Antioquia. In this 
department there have been high levels of migration towards the lowlands of Urabá, Bajo 
Cauca and Magdalena Medio, that have provided a ready workforce for the coca business, all 
in an environment of sustained guerrilla and paramilitary violence.35 
 
Map 3. The Evolution of Coca Crops in the Andean Region 1994-2001 
 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
In the Department of Norte de Santander, 6,700 hectares of coca were cultivated in 2001 in 11 
of the department’s 39 municipalities. Santander, on the other hand, had 2,800 hectares of 
coca under cultivation in 24 of its 87 municipalities. Finally, in Antioquia 3,000 hectares were 
cultivated in 30 of its 124 municipalities.  
 
 
3. The Caribbean Region 
Approximately 5 percent of total production comes from the Caribbean region, concentrated 
in the Department of Bolívar (82 percent) and to a lesser extent in Magdalena (6,2 percent), 
Córdoba (9 percent) and Cesar (5 percent) (see Map 4).36 Bolivar had 5,500 hectares under 
cultivation in 2000, spread over 10 of its 37 municipalities, mostly in the Magdalena Medio 
area of the south of the department. The municipalities where most coca growing is 
                                                 
34 Apart from crude oil, coal, gold, marble and limestone are also produced. 
35 Alejandro Reyes, ‘Compra de tierras por narcotraficantes’, in Drogas ilícitas en Colombia: Su impacto 
económico, político y social, Bogotá: Planeta Colombia Editorial, 1997. 
36 In these areas there exists a great inequality of land distribution, from large scale cattle ranches to small scale 
peasant farming that coexist alongside indigenous reserves such as la Guajira, la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta 
and San Andrés de Sotavento. 
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concentrated are Santa Rosa, Simití, San Pablo and Cantagallo, which are near the Serranía 
de San Lucas and are traditional guerrilla strongholds, due not only to gold mining in the area, 
which provides income, but also to the fact that that the zone is the headquarters of the ELN 
Central Command (COCE). Since 2000, paramilitary activity has increased in the area with 
the presence of the Libertadores del Río Magdalena, Combatientes de la Serranía de San 
Lucas and Vencedores del Sur fronts of the Bloque Central Bolívar. 
 
Map 4. The evolution of Coca Crops in the Caribbean Region 1994-2001 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
4. The Pacific Region 
The Pacific region has many strategic advantages related to coca production, not least of 
which is the fact that it is the transit route for exports leaving via pacific coast ports. 7 percent 
of total coca production comes from this region, principally from the departments of Cauca 
and Nariño, and, to a lesser extent, Chocó and Valle (see Map 5). 
 
3,190 hectares were under cultivation in 1994 in the department of Cauca. This figure had 
grown to 6,291 by 1999, but then fell to 2,900 in 2001. However, the number of 
municipalities in which coca is grown rose from 6 to 12 (out of 39) between 1994 and 2001.  
 
Coca production in Nariño rose rapidly during the last decade, reaching a peak of 9,300 
hectares in 2000. In 2001 this figure fell to 2,000 hectares. Similar to the case of Cauca, the 
geographical dissemination of coca in Nariño rose, from 6 to 19 (out of 62) municipalities. 
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Map 5. The Evolution of Coca Crops in the Pacific Region 1994-2001 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
Interpreting Coca Production in Colombia 
Most explanations of the rising growth of coca production in Colombia point to 
socioeconomic factors such as poverty, marginality, the unequal distribution of wealth and 
income, economic recessions and weak, inadequate State intervention, amongst other aspects. 
The most recurring hypothesis is that the illicit drug business is highly profitable, and that the 
zones in which it is most prevalent are economically precarious. According to Vargas, the 
coca business dates back to the end of the 1970s, when various organised groups formed in 
Miraflores and began to extract cocaine from coca leaves due to rising international demand 
for the drug and the high profitability of the business.37 Although there is little consensus as to 
why the business grew in Colombia, it is clear that the phenomenon began in the late 70s and 
that it was strengthened by the appearance of drug-trafficking organisations.  
 
The initial hypotheses regarding the consolidation of illegal drug production in Colombia 
maintain that the main causes are adverse social and economic conditions, the absence of a 
strong State and the geographical characteristics of the country. Rocha argues that illicit crops 
began to be grown in non-modern regional economies where the traditional activities were 
agriculture and mining, that experienced an unequal distribution of land ownership and that 
were more vulnerable to relative price changes.38 Thus the production of illicit crops was 
concentrated in isolated peasant farming zones that were a long way from the economic 
centres of the country and were politically unstable.39 
                                                 
37 Ricardo Vargas, Drogas, mascaras y juegos, Bogotá: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 1999a. 
38 Ricardo Rocha, La economía colombiana tras 25 años de narcotráfico,  Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, 
2000. 
39 Ricardo Rocha, ‘Aspectos económicos de las drogas ilegales’, in Drogas ilícitas en Colombia: Su impacto 
económico, político y social , Bogotá: Planeta Colombia Editorial, 1997; Ricardo Rocha & Alejandro Vivas, 
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Similarly, Vargas found that illicit crops were most prevalent in regions with a total absence 
of State presence and high levels of violence, where guerrilla groups later arrived to “impose 
order” and support the peasant farmers.40 Vargas has also argued that factors such as a weak 
State presence, armed illegal groups and the production and trafficking of illicit crops 
generate higher levels of violence in a region. The problem worsens as it spreads to 
neighbouring municipalities.41 
 
Thoumi states that Colombia was the perfect place for the establishment and consolidation of 
narcotics production due to the lack of State presence, the patronal system, the violent nature 
of society and the existing culture of illegal exports.42 The large number of Colombian 
immigrants in the USA facilitated the development of distribution networks. However, 
Thoumi rejects the arguments related to poverty and inequality as the root cause of the illegal 
economy and denies the relationship between poverty and the cultivation of illicit crops.43 
 
Other hypotheses maintain that regional crises during the 1980s in the cotton, textiles, sugar 
and emerald markets drove the development of coca production. To these factors may be 
added the crisis of profitability and competitivity, the difficulties related to finance and the 
accumulation of capital, the limitations associated with obtaining advanced technology and a 
precarious commercial infrastructure.44 
 
Similarly, De Rementería states that the coca industry was established due to the unjust 
conditions of international commerce that Latin American countries have to face. Specifically, 
the author studies the appearance of illicit crops in terms of the adverse conditions created by 
an agricultural crisis. According to the author, the origins of the crisis are the subsidies that 
industrialised countries began to pay their farmers, which then generated competitive 
disadvantages for producers in developing countries. The response has been to minimise costs 
by extensively using land, amplifying the agricultural frontier or substituting production with 
natural drugs.45  
 
Mora et al. state that colonisation and coca crops do not generate permanent social riches in 
an area; on the contrary, they generate resource and labour exploitation. 46 Tovar considers that 
coca has become an alternative source of capital in marginal communities that want to better 
their conditions and overcome the exclusion they have suffered at the hands of the traditional 
dominant classes.47 
 
The investigations mentioned show some of the diverse hypotheses regarding the origin, 
causes and consequences of illicit drug production in Colombia; most of them are based on 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Crecimiento regional en Colombia: ¿Persiste la desigualdad?’, Revista de economía del Rosario, 1:1 (January 
1998), pp.67-108; and Thoumi (2002). 
40 Ricardo Vargas, ‘La bonanza de la marimba empezó aquí’, in La Verdad del ’93: paz, derechos humanos y 
violencia, Bogotá: CINEP, 1994. 
41 Vargas (1999a). 
42 Francisco E. Thoumi, Economía política y narcotráfico, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1994. 
43 Thoumi (2002). 
44 Darío Betancourt & Martha L. García, Contrabandistas, marimberos y mafiosos: historia social de la mafia 
colombiana (1965 – 1992), Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1994. 
45 Ibán de Rementería, La guerra de las drogas: Cultivos ilícitos y desarrollo alternativo , Bogotá: Editorial 
Planeta Colombiana SA, 2001. 
46 Leonidas Mora, Jaime Jaramillo & Fernando Cubides, Colonización Coca y Guerilla, Bogotá: Alianza 
Editores Colombiana, 1986. 
47 Hermes Tovar, Colombia: droga, economía, guerra y paz, Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial, 1999. 
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much qualitative but little quantitative evidence. However, no investigation has been carried 
out about the spatial dynamics of illicit crops and their relationship with illegal armed groups. 
Thus, the purpose of this investigation is to offer empirical evidence to show that the 
intensification of the Colombian armed conflict has been the main cause behind the expansion 
of illicit crops in Colombia. 
 
 
Financing Armed Conflict and Illegal Crops: Developing a Model 
Recent Literature on Financing Armed Conflict  
Internal armed conflicts may be defined as the confrontation between State forces and 
organised armed groups that are fighting for a determined political, ideological or economic 
end, including, in some cases, the subversion of a pre-established social order. It should be 
noted that although social, political, economic and international conditions may be the cause 
of confrontation, they are often not in themselves enough to generate armed conflict. One of 
the most important factors related to the growth, development and consolidation of a rebel 
group is its financial viability;48 this is its guarantee of survival, and allows the group to scale 
up its armed activities. The financial viability of rebels or insurgents, and more specifically 
the depredation of productive activities in the zone in which they operate, have become the 
subject of economic analysis. In recent literature, insurgents are seen as political agentswhose 
final objective is to maximise their own benefits via the depredation of productive economic 
activities, whether they be legal or not.49 
 
Hirshleifer states that a conflict depends on the level of profitability of depredation – each 
group of contenders invests its efforts (militants, arms, munitions, etc.) with the hope of 
winning a share of the bounty. Thus, the result of the conflict depends on the rebel group’s 
ability to transform its resources into an offensive capacity in different geographical 
conditions and human contexts. If both contenders enjoy an increase in their wealth, the 
richest of the two will advance, and smaller contenders will become non-viable or will 
become dominated by the bigger players over time.50 
 
Similarly, Grossman developed general equilibrium models to analyse insurrection and 
revolutionary movements, in which rebellion is a non-productive activity that competes with 
productive activities for society’s scarce resources51. In the models there are two main agents: 
the government and peasant families.52 The result of the confrontation depends on the 
technologies of insurrection, production and repression. In the case that insurrection is 
successful, the peasants’ bounty will be the government’s resources and clients. 
 
Equally, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001) and Collier (2000), believe that civil wars arise 
only if there are financially viable organisations, and that the circumstances under which they 
                                                 
48 It is important to note that financial viability is a necessary, but is not the only factor in the generation of a 
conflict situation. 
49 In some cases, rebels are seen as an extreme manifestation of organised crime. 
50 Jack Hirshleifer, ‘The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity’, UCLA Working Paper 491, Los 
Angeles: UCLA, 1990. 
51 Herschel Grossman, ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections’, American Economic Review, 81:4 
(1991), pp.912-921; and ‘Kleptocracy and Revolutions’, Oxford Economic Paper, 51 (1994), pp 267-283. 
52 The government hopes to maximise income from its clients, and thus taxes land and productive activities and 
employs soldiers to dissuade or repress insurrection. For their part, peasant families respond to government 
policies by assigning time to production, militancy or insurrection. 
  
17
exist are genuinely exceptional.53 There is, therefore, a wide gap between popular perceptions 
of the causes of conflict and the results of recent economic analyses. Popular perception sees 
rebellion as a social movement motivated by extreme discontent. In reality it matters little 
whether the rebels are motivated by greed, by a desire for power or due to their discontent, 
which is why the feasibility of depredation is a cause of conflict. Collier and Hoffler state that 
the abundance of natural resources is the factor most closely linked to the rise of a civil 
conflict.54 In contrast, DiJohn argues that natural resources per se do not cause conflict. Civil 
wars are rather the result of country specific historical and political processes, and once the 
conflict is underway the existence of natural resources makes possible the prolongation of  the 
war.55 
 
However, one must remember that the end result of depredation is different between rebel 
groups and criminal organisations. According to Restrepo an organisation in conflict reinvests 
all its resources in the armed struggle, that is, it increases its military apparatus and the 
offensive use of violence.56 Criminal organisations, on the other hand, look towards 
increasing profits. In this context, Gutiérrez states that Collier and Hoefler’s ‘greedy war’ 
hypothesis may not be strictly applied to the Colombian case. In spite of the fact that 
economic incentives for combatants are precarious, there is a degree of individual motivation 
to fight that the ‘greedy war’ theory cannot explain. In addition, this hypothesis does not 
contemplate possible interrelations between the different groups and social organisations.57 
 
The Colombian armed conflict began in the 1960s and, after a long period in hibernation 
during which its growth was precarious and limited to a few rural areas, especially 
colonisation zones at the frontiers of agricultural expansion, the rebel groups (FARC, ELN 
and illegal self-defence forces specifically) began a process of accelerated growth in the 
1980s. This numerical growth and territorial expansion, as well as a significant increase in 
their capacity for military action, was linked to their new economic prosperity. 58 This 
prosperity came from the exploitation of legal and illegal exports, without directly 
participating in them and thus without incurring the direct costs of military activity.59 
 
The depredation of productive activities by armed groups in Colombia has taken place 
through three stages according to Rangel: predatory, parasitic and symbiotic. The predatory 
stage is when the groups have very weak links with the population and, therefore, their 
activities require minimum exposure and produce one-off benefits (activities such as 
territorial piracy, bank robberies, random kidnappings, occasional extortion, amongst others). 
The parasitic phase begins following long-term social infiltration and includes activities such 
                                                 
53 Paul Collier & Anne Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998), 
pp.563-573; and ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, World Bank Working Paper, CSAE WPS/2002-01 (2001). 
Paul Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflicts and their Implications for Policy’, World Bank Working Paper 
(June 2000). 
54 Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2001). 
55 Jonathan DiJohn, ‘Mineral Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assesment of the 
Rentier State Hypothesis’, Crisis State Working Paper, 20, London: London School of Economics, 2002. 
56 Jorge Alberto Restrepo, ‘Análisis económico de conflictos internos’, Documento prepared for Fundación Ideas 
para la Paz, 2001. This is not to say that top officials are not remunerated, that hierarchy does not determine the 
level of remuneration, nor that there is no personal enrichment, on whatever side, due to the conflict. 
57 Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘Criminal Rebels? A Discussion on War and Criminality from the Colombian 
Experience’, Crisis States Working Paper, 17, London: London School of Economics, 2003. 
58 Alfredo Rangel, Guerra Insurgente: conflicto es Malasia, Perú, Filipina, El Salvador y Colombia, Bogota: 
Editorial Intermedio, 2001. 
59 Boris Salazar & María del Pilar Castillo, La Hora de los Dinosaurios: conflicto y depredación en Colombia, 
Bogotá: Fondo Editorial CEREC, 2001. 
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as protection-based extortion, amongst others. Finally, there is the symbiotic stage in which 
the guerrilla economy becomes an integral part of the regional economy and the distinction 
between legal and illegal activities becomes blurred.60  
 
The principal sources of financing for illegal armed groups, in whichever stage, have 
traditionally been extortion, different types of robbery, kidnapping, scams, piracy, the theft of 
municipal fiscal resources and, recently, drug-trafficking; the latter having become a principal 
source of financing. 61 In fact, the guerrillas’ role in the drug trade was initially el gramaje (a 
by weight tax on the production of coca leaf or coca base of between 10 percent and 15 
percent) charged to peasant farmers, and the taxes levied on the laboratories, runways and 
river ports used by drug-traffickers, in exchange for guaranteeing their security. During the 
1990s, guerrilla participation grew considerably; they established their own system of 
production, transport and commercialisation of both precursors and the final product.62 The 
way in which the guerrillas control and regulate the coca business in Colombia is a classic 
example of the symbiotic relationship between insurgency and the regional economy, and, in 
some areas, the distinction between what is legal and what is not has all but disappeared. 
 
Similarly, the illegal self-defence groups grew and developed between 1982 and 1994, to 
offer security to the population in the face of guerrilla actions and to protect land ownership.63 
In 1994, the first paramilitary summit was held with the objective of unifying the command 
structure, concentrating operations and expanding the movement throughout the country. This 
strategy was consolidated by offensive action, and in the mid-1990s the exponential growth of 
violent paramilitary activity began. This growth happened alongside a growth in their sources 
of financing, which until then had been based on the payment of obligatory fees for their 
security services, donations from large-scale landowners and the middle classes and, finally, 
their links with the drug-trade.  
 
In recent years, guerrilla (FARC and ELN) and paramilitary links with the production, 
processing and commercialisation of illegal drugs have become ever stronger.64 A struggle 
has evolved for the control of strategic zones, related as much to finances as to the armed 
struggle itself.65 The money that comes from these sources of financing is reinvested in 
strengthening the war machine. Although this does not allow us to establish a direct link 
between illicit crops and violence, it does show the enormous importance of this activity to 
guerrilla finances and the drug-trade. Bottía stated that the FARC are dedicated to expanding 
their sphere of influence to include the municipalities that guarantee their continued 
                                                 
60 Alfredo Rangel, Colombia: Guerra en el fin de siglo, Bogotá: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 2000. 
61 Vargas (1999a) analysed guerrillas finances over the period 1991-1996 and concluded that 44.4 percent came 
from drug-trafficking; 27.4 percent from extortion and robbery; 21.9 percent from kidnapping, and 6.3 percent 
from municipal funds (Quoted in Thoumi, 2002). 
62 Jesús E. La Rotta, Las finanzas de la Subversión Colombiana: una forma de explotar la nación , Bogotá: 
Alianza Editorial Colombiana, 1996; Vargas (2003). 
63 In Colombia, the organisation of armed civilian groups  by the State or local leaders began in the 19th century. 
The practice effectively ended around the 1940s and 50s, when the armed groups were formed that contributed 
to the period known as ‘La Violencia’. In 1965, decree 3398 defined the defence of the nation as “the 
organisation provision and employment of all the inhabitants and resources of the country, in peacetime, to 
guarantee national independence and institutional stability” and gave temporary powers to the Ministry of 
Defence to arm civilians. The decree was incorporated into law 48, 1968. 
64 Echandía (1999). 
65 Thoumi (2002) states that fighting between the guerrillas and paramilitaries for control of areas such as Urabá, 
is an indication of both groups’ need to control strategic drug-trafficking routes, which are also used to import 
arms and precursors. 
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financing. 66 Sánchez et al. conclude that drug-trafficking is a crime that is closely linked to 
the expansion of illegal armed groups, that is, that the increase in illegal crops is the result of 
these groups’ expansion. 67 
 
Although great advances have been made in terms of analysing the relationship between 
armed groups and coca production in Colombia, no analysis has yet been made into the 
dynamics of illegal crop expansion and its relationship with the armed conflict. Below we 
present a theoretical model that explains this relationship. 
 
 
A Theoretical Model of the Relationship Between Coca and the Conflict 
1. The Model 
This section aims to develop a theoretic model to explain the relationship between coca 
production and the armed conflict. It begins with the assumption that illegal armed groups 
have the fundamental objective of winning territorial control –  the mechanism they use to 
weaken the State or rival groups, generate income and consolidate a social support base.68 
This model aims to establish the inter-temporal decision relationship between the territorial 
control enjoyed by an armed group and the recruitment of the forces it needs to expand its 
military actions. Illicit crops will be the result of this inter-temporal relationship, with the 
contextual parameters of fumigation policies and the State’s military activities. A dynamic 
optimisation model was developed according to the basic model developed by Ramsey.  
 
It begins with the following homogeneous function of degree coca production (that is, 
constant scaled profits): 
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Where: 
Ct= coca production during period t. 
Zt= the territorial control the armed group enjoys in the region. 
Nt= the population in the area controlled by the armed group. 
Gt= the number of active guerrilla fighters.  
l = the area ( percent) dedicated to coca production. 
b = the level of eradication practised by the authorities. 
A= the production factor.  
 
Equation 1 in per capita terms (lower case letters):69 
                                                 
66 Martha Bottía, ‘La presencia y expansión municipal de las FARC: Es avaricia y contagio, más que ausencia 
estatal’, Documento CEDE, 2003-03, Bogotá: CEDE, 2003. 
67 Fabio Sánchez, Ana María Díaz & Michel Formisano, ‘Conflicto, violencia y actividad criminal en Colombia: 
un análisis espacial’, Documentos CEDE 2003-05, Bogotá: CEDE, 2003. 
68 Fernán González, Ingrid Bolívar & Teófilo Vázquez, Violencia Política en Colombia. De la nación 
fragmentada a la construcción del Estado, Bogotá: CINEP, 2002. 
69 It is assumed that function f is strictly concave and that it satisfies the conditions of Inada: 
0)0( =f , ¥=)0('f  y 0)(' =¥f . 
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Equally, the group has to confront the following budgetary restriction at each moment in time: 
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Where: 
wn= the salary earned by the population involved in coca production. 
wg= the salaries and equipment costs of active guerrilla fighters 
Pz= the cost of maintaining territorial control  
 
Equation 3 implies that the income obtained from coca production is spent on coca workers’ 
salaries, maintaining troops, maintaining territorial control and recruiting new members. 
 
Once again, in per capita terms: 
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Where n, represents the population growth rate in the region.  
 
The preferences of the armed group over time can be represented by using the integer of 
instant profit: 
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Which implies that immediate profits depend positively on the territorial control that the 
group enjoys in the region, tz , where q  represents the armed groups’ inter-temporal discount 
rate. Furthermore: 
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Thus, the armed groups problem of maximisation is:  
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Where the control variable is tz  and the state variable is tg . This means that the armed group 
must find an optimum path to territorial control that allows it to maximise profitability, 
subject to inter-temporal restrictions. The optimum path to territorial control determines the 
optimum number of guerrilla troops and coca production during each period.   
 
Thus, the Hamiltonian is: 
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Therefore, the first order conditions for the Hamiltonian and the transversal conditions are, 
respectively: 
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Having derived the first order conditions and with some algebra, we found the dynamic 
equations for control variable zt, and for state variable gt. 
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In a stationary state, 
·
tz = 
·
tg = 0. The phase diagram, in plane (zt, gt) allows us to determine 
the equilibrium dynamics (zt*,gt*), and establish whether it is stable 70. 
 
The phase diagram and the curves 
·
tz = 
·
tg = 0 are presented in the graph below: 
 
 
 
 
 
The different signs are due to the result of three plausible equilibriums, which depend on the 
sign of the following derivatives 
0<
t
t
g
z
d
d
 in 
·
g , t
t
z
g
d
d
·
 and t
t
g
z
d
d
·
, and also on whether the curve 
·
tz =0 cuts the curve 
·
tg =0 before or after its point of inflection.  
 
Case 1 
 
                                                 
70 To determine the stationary state curves, we assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function, and plausible 
values were given to the different parameters used in the model. 
·
tg = 0
tg
tz ·
tz = 0
·
tg = 0
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tz
*tz
tg *
A 
·
tz = 0
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In case 1, equilibrium is established at point A under the assumption that 
0<
t
t
g
z
d
d
 in 
·
g , t
t
z
g
d
d
·
> 
0, and  t
t
g
z
d
d
·
> 0. As can be seen, the resulting equilibrium is a saddle point. 
 
 
Case 2 
 
In case 2, equilibrium is reached at point B, with the assumption that 
0>
t
t
g
z
d
d
 in 
·
g , t
t
z
g
d
d
·
<0, 
and  t
t
g
z
d
d
·
<0. Similar to case A, the resulting equilibrium is also a saddle point.  
 
 
Case 3 
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In case 3, equilibrium is reached at point C, with the assumption that 
0<
t
t
g
z
d
d
 in 
·
g , t
t
z
g
d
d
·
> 0, 
and  t
t
g
z
d
d
·
< 0. The resulting equilibrium is stable.  
 
 
2. Comparative Statistics 
In this section we aim to establish the impact of eradication efforts b  carried out by the 
authorities, and the cost of controlling the territory, Pz, on the previously mentioned 
equilibriums. 
 
a. Changes in eradication initiativesb  
The dynamic equations 0=
·
tz  and 0=
·
tg  are totally derived, to obtain the signs of db
d
·
tz  and 
db
d
·
tg : 
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The following graph shows the shifts of curves 0=
·
tz  y 0=
·
tg and reflects changes in 
eradication efforts that determine the new levels of equilibrium for z and g. 
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The results of the comparative statistics show that in the face of changes to eradication efforts, 
the illegal armed groups choose to consolidate their territorial presence, and sacrifice 
recruitment efforts. Thus, when faced with an increase in eradication efforts, territorial control 
increases and the number of fighters in the organisation falls (see the two cases mentioned in 
the appendix). 
 
To evaluate the impact of a change in b  on coca production we started from the base of 
equation (1) that, once the optimum levels of zt* and gt* have been found, can be expressed 
thus: 
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It can be seen that the first term of this expression is always negative, whilst the second 
depends on the signs and magnitude of 
db
d *tz  and 
db
d *tg . The total effect is, therefore, 
ambiguous. If the second term is positive, and lower than the first, coca production falls as a 
result of the increased probability of eradication. However, if the second term is positive and 
larger than the first, it is possible that coca production rises in spite of increased eradication 
efforts71.  
 
                                                 
71 The simulations used a Cobb-Douglas production function and reasonable parameters, and always showed a 
reduction in coca production following increased eradication efforts. 
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b. Changes in the price or cost of territorial control Pz  
According to the equations, curve 0=
·
tz  is not affected by a change in the cost of territorial 
control in a region Pz, whilst the effect or shift of curve 0=
·
tg  following a change in Pz  
results in: 
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Thus the new equilibriums are:  
 
 
As can be seen in the graph, if the cost of maintaining territorial control, Pz, rises, greater 
efforts are made towards consolidating control, to the detriment of the number of combatants 
(see the other two cases in the annexes).  
 
 
 
In terms of the effect of the increased cost of territorial control on coca production we find 
that: 
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Once again, the results are ambiguous and depend on the signs and magnitudes of 
z
t
P
z
d
d *
 and 
z
t
P
g
d
d *
.72 
                                                 
72 In the annex appear another two cases when there is a changing in the probability of eradication and changes 
in the cost of territorial control. 
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In summary, the theoretical model shows that there exist optimal levels of territorial control 
and number of active guerrilla fighters that determine the amount of coca produced. However, 
changes in exogenous variables such as activity of the army (related to the price of territorial 
control) or eradication efforts  have ambiguous effects on coca production. 
 
Coca Geography and Armed Conflict in Colombia  
The Geography of the Armed Conflict  and its Relationship with Coca 
At the start of the 1980s, guerrilla and paramilitary activity was limited to a few rural areas, 
especially colonization zones at the frontier of agricultural expansion. However, the map of 
the conflict has changed considerably since the 1990s. The armed conflict has extended to 
include almost all national territory, and has been linked to the search for strategic zones of 
financing and armed conflict.73  
 
Since the mid-1990s, FARC strategy has included the harassment of the civilian population, 
confrontations with the Colombian army, as well as the desire to strengthen its control of 
different regions. Thus, this guerrilla group’s military actions have been focussed towards 
territorial control, not just of colonisation zones and areas of illicit crops, but also of 
economically rich regions, all in the context of its strategy of confronting the State.74 This 
guerrilla group has, therefore, changed its condition from being a rural guerrilla force, with an 
influence only in periphery zones, to becoming a force in urban centres that are integrated to 
the nucleus of domestic production. 75 
 
Most areas in which the FARC are active are also illicit crop growing areas (see Map 6). This 
is the result, in terms of our hypothesis, of the expansion of the conflict. The Bloque Sur’s 
zone of influence covers the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo, which are the two areas 
with the highest levels of coca production. 76  
 
During the 1990s, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) also began a territorial 
expansion process concentrated in the north of Colombia, with 5 fronts, the most important of 
which is the Nororiental that operates in the department of Santander. The other fronts 
operate in southern Bolivar (Serranía de San Lucas), Antioquia, Cauca and the south of Huila. 
The ELN is also beginning to operate in Tolima and Cundinamarca. The group has 41 fronts 
and a total of about 5,000 combatants.  
 
This group’s territorial expansion is concentrated in zones rich in natural resources: oil, coal, 
gold and emeralds. As in the case of the FARC, this expansion strategy is linked to the search 
for sources of financing, the most important of which is the exploitation of extractive 
economic activities.77 The ELN’s relationship with drug production is most important in the 
                                                 
73 González et al. (2002). 
74 González et al. (2002). 
75 The FARC now has 23,000 fighters divided into 62 fronts that operate throughout the country. The fronts form 
part of the 5 blocks: the bloque Caribe, that operates on the Atlantic coast, the bloque Central that operates in 
Tolima, Huila and Cundinamarca, the bloque Sur, that operates in Nariño, Putumayo and Caquetá, the bloque 
Oriental that operates in Meta, Vichada and Guaviare and the bloque Jóse María Córdoba that operates in Urabá 
and Antioquia. 
76 Vicepresidencia de la República de Colombia, Colombia, Conflicto Armado, Regiones, Derechos Humanos, 
DIH 1998-2002, Bogotá: República de Cuba, 2002. 
77 It has been estimated that around 66 percent of ELN income comes from extortion, followed by kidnapping 
(28 percent), and drug trafficking (6 percent) (Vicepresidencia de la República, 2002). 
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Bloque Norte, specifically in southern Bolívar, a strategic coca production zone in the 
Caribbean region. 
 
Map 6. FARC Activity and the Presence of Coca Crops in Colombia  
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
Map 7. ELN Activity and the Presence of Coca Crops in Colombia 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
The illegal self-defence groups have also enjoyed sustained growth since the mid-1990s. They 
went from 850 members in 1992 to 8,150 in 2000, which allowed them to consolidate 
theirpower, especially in northwest Colombia (Antioquia, Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar, and even 
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Norte de Santander) and to advance on towards the south and east of Colombia.78 The self-
defence groups obtain their finances principally from coca cultivation and drug-trafficking, 
although they also obtain income from extorting agricultural and cattle farmers. They also use 
a system of extortion in coca and opium poppy growing regions under their control, namely 
southern Bolívar, the Catatumbo Valley, Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá and Putumayo, where the 
self-defence forces charge security quotas to coca growing peasant farmers.79 
 
Map 8. Paramilitary Activity and the Presence of Coca Crops  
 
 
Source:  authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map 
 
The Spatial Relationship Between the Armed Conflict and Coca Crops 
Although the direct relationship between illicit crops and the armed conflict has been 
extensively studied, the patterns of the relationship and spatial diffusion between these two 
activities has not been studied at all. In this section we will analyse these cluster patterns and 
the overspill of coca growing into neighbouring municipalities. We will also examine the 
characteristics of the dynamic relationship between the activities of illegal armed actors and 
coca production in Colombia, using spatial analysis techniques.80 
 
                                                 
78 According to González et al (2002), Urabá, northern Antioquia, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Magdalena Medio, 
southern Bolivar, Cesar and Catatumbo are an east-west corridor that has become the centre of confrontations 
between armed groups, especially the paramilitary and FARC, that have lead to the ELN’s military and territorial 
recession. 
79 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, ‘Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia’, Documento de Estudio, 
Bogotá: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2000, at www.mindefensa.gov.co. 
80 Specifically, Local Spatial Association Indicators (LISA) were used, according to Cohen and Tita’s 
methodology used  to analyse violent behaviour in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania (Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, 
‘Difussion in Homicide Exploring a General Method for Detecting Spatial Diffusion Processes’, Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology , 15:4 (1999), pp.451-494). 
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1. Spatial Indicators Of The Armed Conflict And Coca Crops  
In this section we present a set of indicators that relate coca crops (hectares under cultivation 
at municipal level) to the armed conflict (attacks on municipalities by illegal armed actors), in 
order to determine the spatial association patterns that exist between the entities under 
investigation. The behaviour of the variables in a geographic unit and in their neighbouring 
geographic unit were examined,81 in an Euclidian plane where each point expresses the 
relationship between the two standardised variables.82 This plane is divided into four 
quadrants. The X-axis contains the local municipality variables and the Y-axis the 
neighbouring ones. Thus, the first quadrant contains the high local and neighbouring variable 
points (quadrant H,H), in the second quadrant we find low local variables and high 
neighbouring ones (L,H), in the third quadrant both local and neighbouring variables are low 
(L,L) and in the fourth, local variables are high and neighbouring ones are low (H,L). In 
addition, the points in quadrant (H,H) outside the circle of standard deviations are groups of 
municipalities or clusters of municipalities (regions) where coca growing is well above 
average. 
 
Graph 6 shows the current relationship between cultivated hectares in each municipality and 
those of its neighbours.83 A clear spatial association is evident. The average spatial correlation 
coefficient for the period 1999-2001 is 0.60. This implies that the presence of illicit crops in 
Colombia has a high spatial dependence, that is, the number of hectares under cultivation in 
one region depends on the situation in neighbouring regions. In addition, the points outside 
the two standard deviations are critical points or hot-spots. Amongst these are 7 of 
Putumayo’s 13 municipalities (Puerto Asís, Puerto Caicedo, San Miguel, La Hormiga, Orito, 
amongst others); Miraflores and San José in Guaviare; Cartagena del Chairá, Solano and San 
Vicente in Caquetá, and La Macarena in Meta.  
 
Graph 6. Local And Neighbouring Coca Production, (standardised average 1999-2001) 
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                           Source: Authors’ calculations. * The hectares have been standardised 
                                                 
81 The criteria of neighbouring areas was obtained using a spatial contiguous matrix for 1,062 municipalities. It is 
a square matrix Wij, where each of the elements i and j are the inverse distance between the points i and j, and 
the furthest units have the lowest values. See Rosina Moreno & Esther Vayá, Técnicas econométricas para el 
tratamiento de datos espaciales: La econometría espacial, Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 
2000. 
82 Standardised means (Xi-Xmed)/DST, where Xi is the observation value i of the variable X, Xmed is the 
medium of X, and DST is the standard deviation of X. 
83 The average number of cultivated hectares in neighbouring areas is the sum of cultivated hectares in the other 
municipalities, adjusted by the the inverse distance between the local municipality and the others. 
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The relationship between the neighbouring presence of illegal armed groups and neighbouring 
coca crops is presented in graphs 7 to 9. It is evident that there is a grouping pattern amongst 
these variables, especially relevant to the FARC. In those regions where there is a high 
number of cultivated hectares (standardised) there is also high presence of armed actors; 
municipalities with a low presence of illegal groups also have fewer cultivated hectares of 
coca. In all cases there are hot spots with a high presence of armed actors and also a large 
number of cultivated hectares dedicated to coca production. 
 
The positive correlation between regional coca crops and the regional activities of the FARC 
is shown in graph 7. The critical points are all those outside the red circle. However, those of 
interest are those in which the two activities are well above the average (more than two 
standard deviations) – the municipalities of Puerto Caicedo, San Miguel, San Francisco and 
Puerto Guzmán in Putumayo; and Solita, Solano and San Vicente del Cagúan in Caquetá. 
 
Graph 7.  Regional Coca Production and Farc Activity, (standardised average 1999-2001) 
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                        Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
In contrast, the correlation between regional coca crops and ELN activity is not so high, as 
can be seen in graph 8, and there are no critical points in which the relationship between these 
two variables is central. However, there are some municipalities in which the presence of each 
of these variables is high, as is the cases in Fortul (Arauca), Puerto Wilches (Santander) and 
Yondó (Antioquia), which have a high level of ELN activity. In contrast, Puerto Caicedo 
(Putumayo) had a high number of average cultivated hectares of coca between 1999 and 2001. 
 
Graph 9 shows the positive relationship between cultivated hectares and regional paramilitary 
activity. It can be seen that one of the critical points where high levels  of paramilitary activity 
accompany a large number of cultivated hectares is the municipality of Morroa in the 
department of Sucre. The other points indicate a high level of one or other of the two 
activities. 
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Graph 8. Regional Coca Production and ElN Activity in Neighbouring Areas, 
(standardised average 1999-2001) 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Graph 9. Regional Coca Production and The Regional Paramilitary Activity (standardised 
average 1999-2001) 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
2. The Diffusion and Spatial Dynamics of Illicit Crops and the Armed Conflict 
The spatial diffusion of illicit crops is shown in two different ways: contagious diffusion and 
hierarchic diffusion. Contagious diffusion, as its name suggests, is where one region infects 
its neighbour with coca production. This type of diffusion can, in turn, be classified in two 
different ways: ‘relocation’ – coca crops move to neighbouring areas and production ends in 
the local municipality due to eradication or other factors – and ‘expansive diffusion’ – the 
presence of coca spreads from the municipality towards contiguous spatial units, but 
production continues in the local municipality. Hierarchic diffusion, in turn, occurs without 
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spatial contact, that is, by imitation or innovation. 84 For example, illegal armed groups from 
other regions see the profitability of the business and the low costs, and decide to begin 
cultivation, thus increasing the presence of coca in other regions. When analysing diffusion 
dynamics, it is necessary to study the  changes in cultivated hectares in local and neighbouring 
municipalities, and to relate this to the changing activities of armed groups in local and 
neighbouring municipalities. 
 
The diffusion process is clearly seen in a Cartesian plane (Graph 10). There are two types of 
contagious diffusion: a) expansion between neighbours, when few cultivated hectares in the 
local municipality and many in the neighbouring one become many in the local municipality 
and few in the neighbour, and a set of neighbours goes from quadrant (L,H) to (H,H). The 
opposite may also occur when a group of municipalities goes from (H,L) to (L,L); b) 
relocation between neighbours, when cultivated hectares go from low in the local area and 
high in the neighbour to high in the local area and few in the neighbour; in this case, a set of 
municipalities goes from quadrant (L,H) to (H,L). The opposite may also occur when a group 
of municipalities goes from (H,L) to (L,H). 
 
Graph 10. The Dynamics of Spatial Diffusion 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The dynamics of hierarchic diffusion may be classified thus (Graph 10): a) Isolated rise or 
fall, presented when cultivated hectares rise (fall) in the local municipality without those of 
the neighbouring area being high (low). Local municipalities go from quadrant (L,L) to (H, L) 
in the case of a rise, and from quadrant (H,H) to (L,H) in the case of a fall; b) global rise or 
fall, presented when both the local and neighbouring municipality go from having few 
cultivated hectares to having many, or from many to few. In the first case they go from 
quadrant (L,L) to (H,H) and in the second from (H,H) to (L,L). 
 
In graph 11 the diffusion processes between municipal coca crops and their neighbours is 
presented for the period 1994 and 1999-2001 (average hectares).85 12 municipalities presented 
                                                 
84 Cohen & Tita (1999). 
85 This period was chosen because it is the current information about cultivated hectares of coca in Colombian 
municipalities. 
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contagious diffusion – expansion and relocation – and 103 contracted. 182 municipalities 
experienced growing hierarchic diffusion, whilst 23 fell. Thus, the diffusion of coca 
production is more due to hierarchic diffusion, in which dissemination responds more to 
innovation or imitation; this is exactly what is expected when the diffusion of crops is the 
result of illegal groups expanding their activities. 
 
 
Graph 11. Spatial Diffusion of Local and Neighbouring Coca Crops 1994/1999-2001 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Graph 12. Spatial Regional Diffusion of Coca And FARC Regional Presence 1994/2001 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Graph 12 shows the results for regional coca crops and regional FARC activity, and allows 
one to see the way in which FARC regional expansion corresponds to regional rises in coca 
crops. The exercise shows that between 1999 and 2001, compared with 1994, 26 groups of 
municipalities experimented contagious diffusion – expansion or relocation – and that 115 
groups experienced falling contagious diffusion or relocation. In turn, growing hierarchic 
diffusion was evident in 222 groups of municipalities, whilst falling hierarchic diffusion was 
evident in 3 groups of municipalities. These results imply that regional rises in abundant coca 
crops were preceded by a high previous regional presence of the FARC. 
 
Graph 13. Spatial Diffusion of Regional and Coca Regional ELN 1994/1999-2001 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The relationship between regional coca crops and ELN activity in neighbouring areas is 
shown in Graph 13. It can be seen that 18 groups of municipalities presented growing 
contagious diffusion or relocation, whilst 27 groups experimented falling contagious diffusion 
or relocation. In turn, 154 groups of neighbouring municipalities presented rising hierarchic 
diffusion, whilst 1 showed falling hierarchic diffusion.  
 
Graph 14 shows the same diagram related to illegal self-defence groups. The results show that 
3 municipalities experienced growing contagious diffusion and 140 growing hierarchic 
diffusion. In turn, 142 municipalities experimented falling contagious diffusion and 21 falling 
hierarchic diffusion.  
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Graph 14. Spatial Diffusion of Regional Coca and Regional Self-defence Groups 
1994/1999-2001 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Eradication of Coca in Colombia 
1. The History and Policies of Eradication 
The drug problem in Colombia was originally based on converting coca paste into cocaine, 
and then commercialising the drug. Anti drug-trafficking legislation reflected this structure. 
The legal framework was then amplified and an anti-drug jurisdiction was created, of a 
similar nature to international legislation. 
 
In 1976 the National Drugs Council (CNE) was created to create policies, plans and 
programmes designed to combat the production, trafficking and consumption of psychotropic 
substances.86 Furthermore, from 1986 the legal framework began to grow and the cultivation 
of illicit crops was made a crime related to drug-trafficking. At the same time, eradication 
efforts began. Law 30 of 1986 enabled the CNE to become the Special Administrative Unit in 
charge of developing and adopting government policies related to the prevention, 
rehabilitation and repression of illicit crops in Colombia. 
 
During the 1990s, the production of illicit crops rose considerably, reflecting the insufficient 
efforts of the drug war, and the need to modify it. Priority was given to mechanic or manual 
destruction (plant by plant), aerial or manual spraying, burning and the use of biological 
means. 
 
                                                 
86 The National Drugs Council is made up of the Ministries of Justice, Defence, Education, Health and Foreign 
Affairs, the National Drugs Director, the General Procurator, the Administrative Security Director, the National 
Police Force Director and the General Attorney. 
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The most intensely used of all these methods has been aerial fumigation; it had already been 
used at the end of the 1970s to reduce marihuana crops in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta 
and the Serranía del Perijá. Gaviria’s government (1990-1994) approved the aerial spraying 
of coca with glifosato (and of opium poppies in the departments of Cauca, Tolima and Huila). 
However, it was not until Samper became President in 1994 that aerial spraying of coca and 
marihuana crops was extended throughout most of Colombia, especially the south of the 
country. Aerial fumigation has been considerably intensified in recent years under Plan 
Colombia.87 130,000 hectares were fumigated in 2002, as can be seen in graph 15.  
 
Graph 15. The Eradication of Coca Crops: 1994-2002 
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                            Source: National Drugs Office88 
 
Aerial eradication initially focussed on the department of Guaviare (see Table 1), and to a 
lesser extend on Putumayo, Caquetá and Meta. However, since 2002 coverage has increased 
considerably to cover 12 departments. The new epicentre of fumigation is Putumayo, the 
country’s principal producer of coca. In 2001, 32,000 hectares were fumigated in Putumayo, 
17,000 in Caquetá and 7,000 in Guaviare – around 60 percent of all coca production in the 
country.  
 
In addition, alternative development programmes have been designed that offer incentives for 
substituting illicit crops for economically sustainable activities. The PLANTE presidential 
programme and Plan Colombia have led to the eradication of between 1,000 and 3,000 
hectares, and have benefited 54,551 families. 
 
The efficacy of policies designed to combat illicit crops has been heavily questioned. Vargas 
argues that the war on drugs has been a failure because it is based on erroneous market 
hypotheses:  
                                                 
87 Plan Colombia was designed by the Colombian government and is internationally financed. It was ratified in 
2000 by President Clinton of the USA and President Pastrana of Colombia. The plan has four principal 
components: 1. economic and social recovery, 2. an end to the armed conflict, 3. the strengthening of institutions 
and social development, and 4. an anti-drugs strategy. $1.6bn have been donated to the plan, of which $81m are 
destined to alternative development, whilst $663.5m have been used to equip the police and army for the war on 
drugs. 
88 The figures for manual eradication in 2002 are still not available. 
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...those fighting drug-trafficking appear to have ignored the paradox generated by 
high profits; however effective measures are in the short-term, the incentive to 
increase production in the long term is greater. If the coca supply is limited, prices 
rise and this in itself is an incentive for more producers to become involved in the 
business.89  
According to Uprimmy:  
Effective repression in one region simply displaces production and trafficking to 
another zone, as long as demand remains dynamic, due to the simple nature of the 
means of production and the extensive geographical possibilities.90 
 
Regarding alternative development, Thoumi believes that this type of project runs into 
problems, not only because it is difficult to find legal alternatives that generate an income 
comparable to that generated by coca, but also because the incentives can actually make 
people more likely to begin growing coca or expand existing crops, to become eligible for 
State help. Thus, if a reduction in the number of hectares cultivated with coca is what is 
desired, alternative development may not be the most efficient strategy. 91 However, De 
Rementería sustains that alternative development may be advantageous to poor peasant 
farmers, due to the agricultural recession, and could become a non-violent option to control 
illicit cultivation. However, it is not enough just to reduce illicit cultivation, which responds 
to other factors that are not included in this type of programme.92  
 
2. The Diffusion and Dynamics of Illicit Crops and Eradication  
Similar to the analysis of the diffusion of illicit crops and the armed conflict, exercises 
designed to find the spatial association indicators were carried out. In graph 16, the spatial 
diffusion pattern between regional coca production and coca eradication between 1999 and 
2001 is presented. 23 municipalities experienced growing contagious diffusion and 4 
presented growing hierarchic diffusion. Additionally, 2 municipalities showed falling 
contagious diffusion and none experienced falling hierarchic diffusion.  
 
The graph shows that between 1994 and 2001, coca expanded from regions with high levels 
of eradication and low levels of coca, to regions with high levels of both eradication and coca, 
or low levels of eradication and high levels of coca. This graph implies that eradication 
policies have resulted in the increased “infection” of neighbouring municipalities. The left 
plane contrasts the right plane; in fact, the latter shows almost non-existent levels of 
hierarchic diffusion. 
 
                                                 
89 Vargas (1994); Ricardo Vargas, Fumigación y conflicto: Políticas antidrogas y deslegitimación del Estado en 
Colombia, Bogotá: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 1999b. 
90 Rodrigo Uprimmy, ‘Narcotráfico, régimen político, violencia y derechos humanos en Colombia’, in Ricardo 
Vargas (ed.), Drogas, poder y región, Bogotá: CINEP, 1995. 
91 Thoumi (2002). 
92 De Rementería (2001). 
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Graph 16. Coca Eradication, 1994-2002 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Econometric Evidence 
Hypothesis 
In the theoretical model presented above, a relationship was shown between the conflict, 
territorial expansion of the armed groups and coca cultivation. This relationship is presented 
in equation (1): 
  
*)1*,(
1
1
* ttt gzAfc -+
= g
b (1) 
 
Where ct*,,  zt*, and gt* represent the optimum values per capita for hectares under 
cultivation, territorial control and the number of combatants. The equations for 
·
tz = 
·
tg = 0, 
presented above, allow us to determine that the optimum values for zt* y gt* can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
zt* = zt*(?, ß, Wg, Wn, n, Pz),   (14)  
and 
gt* =gt*( ß, Wg, Wn, n, Pz) (15) 
 
Equations (14) and (15) show that the optimum values for territorial control and the number 
of active combatants (expansion of the conflict) are based on a set of exogenous variables 
such as labour income in the region, the combatants’ ‘wage’, fumigation and the cost of 
territorial control. The model shows that coca cultivation depends on territorial control and 
the number of combatants in the armed groups (or their activities). That is, there is a strong 
relationship between the presence and expansion of illicit crops and the presence and 
expansion of illegal armed groups. The previous section showed how this relationship forms 
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via interaction between the spatial diffusion of illicit crops and the spatial diffusion of the 
conflict. The following subsection quantifies the magnitude of the relationship between the 
conflict and illicit crops using matching estimators, which allow us to correct any endogenous 
problems in the relationship. 
 
Matching Estimators 
To determine the effect of armed groups’ activities on coca cultivation, an econometric model 
could be used in which the dependant variable is the number of cultivated hectares and the 
independent variable is armed activity. It could also be controlled by proxy variables or could 
include the exogenous variables in equations (14) and (15) (poverty, inequality, and 
geographical, judicial and anti-drug activity variables, etc.),93 as is shown in the equation 
below: 
 
tititititititi SAEJGEOGCoca ,,8,6,5,3,21, eaaaaaa ++++++=      (16) 
 
Where tiCoca ,  is the variable indicating the presence of illicit crops in municipality i in year t, 
G is the matrix that contains information related to the presence of each of the armed groups 
in municipality i at moment t, GEO is the matrix of geographical and spatial characteristics, J 
is a vector containing information related to judicial efficiency (a proxy of Pz), AE is a vector 
containing information related to productive activities and wealth in each of the municipalities 
and S is a matrix containing the socioeconomic characteristics of each municipality, such as 
GINI, NBI, level of education, amongst others (proxies of Wg and Wn). 
 
However, various errors are evident in this exercise; the estimates of the parameters could be 
biased, have erroneous significance levels and could therefore lead to incorrect conclusions. 
In the first place, there could be endogenity between the presence of coca crops and illegal 
armed activity – illegal armed actions could, in turn, depend on illegal productive activities. 
In the second place, the armed groups’ actions are a decision variable, that depends on 
variables GEO, J, AE and S, leading us to commit the error known as selection bias.94 In fact, 
the theoretical model shows how an “optimal” armed conflict (expressed as the number of 
men and women in arms or their activities) depends on variables GEO, J, AE and S, which 
gives theoretic credence to the hypothesis proposed here. 
 
To overcome the endogenous inconveniences, and to ensure that the empirical estimates 
reflect the theoretical model, a non-parametric method was used that enabled us to analyse the 
existing relationship between coca crops, illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN and illegal self-
defence groups) and aerial spraying. The methodology used was that of matching estimators, 
which enabled us to answer the following question: What would be the value of cultivated 
hectares of coca in a municipality with illegal armed group presence if these groups had not 
been present? The answer will show the effect of the armed conflict (expressed via the 
                                                 
93 In fact, probabilistic econometric exercises were carried out (Spatial Probit) to try and find the determinants of 
illegal activity in Colombian municipalities, using spatial econometric tools. However, the results, although 
satisfactory, presented problems related to endogenity and multicolinearity, which is why the models were 
calculated using the methodology proposed here. 
94 James Heckman, ‘Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error (With an application to the Estimation of 
Labor Supply Functions)’, NBER Working Paper, w1072, Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1977; James Heckman, Hidehiko Ichmura, Jeffrey Smith & Petra Todd, ‘Characterizing Selection Bias 
Using Experimental Data’, Econometrica, 66:5 (1998), pp.1017-1098; Petra Todd, A Practical Guide to 
Implementing Matching Estimators, mimeo, 1999. 
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activity of these groups) on the number of hectares cultivated with coca in a municipality. The 
problem with this type of analysis is that it is impossible to observe the same municipality, at 
the same moment in time, with and without the activity of an armed group, and then to 
compare the number of hectares cultivated in each scenario. The fact that one of the events is 
not physically observable means that a simulation has to be carried out.  
 
In other words, if Coca1 and Coca2 represent the number of cultivated hectares of coca in 
municipalities with and without the presence of armed actors respectively, what we need to 
know is: How many cultivated hectares would there be in municipalities with the presence of 
illegal armed groups (Coca1½Z, Ai=1), if those armed groups were not present (Coca2½Z, 
Ai=0)? The difference between these two values, (Coca1½Z, Ai=1) - (Coca2½Z, Ai=0), is the 
effect of illegal armed group presence on cultivated hectares of coca. However, (Coca2½Z, 
Ai=0) is non-observable. It is, therefore, necessary to simulate it via a secondary estimate of 
variable A (the activities of illegal armed groups). This simulation will permit a comparison 
of the number of hectares in each municipality with illegal armed activity, with those of 
municipalities without illegal armed activity but with a similar probability of experiencing the 
presence of an armed group. In other words, each municipality with armed group presence 
should be paired (compared) with the most similar municipality that does not present any 
illegal armed activity. 
 
The first step is to determine the probability that an armed group will begin activities in a 
given municipality by using binary, probit or logit selection models, which have explanatory 
variables that are similar or proxy to the equation’s exogenous variables (15), as well as other 
controls (persistence and diffusion variables of the group’s activities in the municipalities – 
temporary and spatial lags95 of the dependant variable – as well as, geographical, judicial, 
economic and social factors). These regressions will serve to estimate the prior probability. 
For example, if a probability model is constructed for FARC activity in Colombian 
municipalities, the probability of this group’s entering a municipality may be estimated, given 
the characteristics of all other municipalities. This probability will be enough to carry out the 
matching exercise. The probability of an armed group beginning activities could be high or 
low, independent of whether or not they had been active in the area before. We used the 
equation below to calculate this probability: 
  
)()1Pr( ji ZfZA w==               (17) 
 
Using the probabilities that result from the probit models, municipalities may be paired via a 
matching estimator. This procedure consists of generating a control group that allows us to 
compare the effect of intervention on a municipality (in this case, illegal armed activity) with 
municipalities that have an equal probability of intervention, although they did not actually 
experience it. Various types of matching estimators may be used: simple average nearest 
neighbour, kernel or local linear regression.  
 
The simple average nearest neighbour estimator allows a comparison of each municipality 
with armed activity with those that have the closest mathematical probability of some kind of 
attack, but which have not yet experienced it. By using the values calculated for ? ,  a  
probability estimate of illegal armed activity can be made for each municipality (propensity 
score). The differences between each municipality with illegal armed activity and each 
                                                 
95 These are spatial Probit models. The spatial variables are presented in the spatial contiguity matrix, which 
solves the spatial autocorrelation problem. See Moreno and Vayá (2000). 
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municipality without it can then be calculated to form a distance vector that should be ordered 
from the lowest to the highest. The number of cultivated hectares in each municipality should 
then be compared with the N closest municipalities in terms of probability, but that do not 
have illegal armed activity. This investigation used 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 20 neighbours. Thus, for 
these N municipalities, the number of cultivated hectares of coca should be calculated as 
follows: 
 
å
=
=
N
j
j
km N
Coca
Coca
1
,                 (18) 
 
Equation (18) simulates the number of hectares of coca municipality k would have had if it 
were a municipality without illegal armed activity. Therefore, (Cocai- Cocam,k) is the effect of 
illegal armed activity on the number of cultivated hectares. The simulation should be carried 
out for all municipalities with illegal armed activity, in order to find the average difference, 
called the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): 
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Where Nt are municipalities with illegal armed activity. The ATT value is the effect of armed 
activity or the conflict on the number of cultivated hectares of coca. 
 
The kernel estimator methodology is similar to that of the simple average nearest neighbour, 
but a 1/x weighting is assigned to all observations in the comparison group. All municipalities 
with guerrilla presence are paired with weighed averages of all the controls, using weighs that 
are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the treated and the 
control group. This means that the weighting is selected to ensure that the closest observations 
(in terms of distance |P(Xi ) - P(Xj )|) are given greater weighs. This weighting is reached via 
a kernel function that requires the choice of a bandwidth; this is equivalent to choosing the 
number of neighbours in the case of the simple average nearest neighbour.96  
 
Finally, the lineal local regression estimators are based on a non parametric regression 
technique in which for each propensity score a weighed least square regression for Coca is 
estimated on a constant term and on the difference in probabilities between the treated and the 
controls, in those municipalities with illegal armed activity. We use the data in which the 
difference is zero, and the parameter of the constant will be the estimated difference.97  
 
Once the estimators for whichever of these methodologies have been calculated, one must 
verify their reliability. As the techniques used are not parametric, a method should be used 
that allows us to obtain almost real solutions using random data. The procedure most often 
used in these cases is bootstrapping – taking samples from the original sample  B that allow 
one to obtain the difference for each of the models. The prediction error is then quantified, 
and the average of all these errors is the estimate of the prediction standard error. 
 
This methodology may also be used to evaluate the effect of illicit crops on rebel and 
paramilitary activity, allowing us to examine the hypothesis that coca crops explain the 
                                                 
96 Todd (1999). 
97 Todd (1999). 
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conflict. To do this, we tried to determine armed group activity in municipalities with coca 
crops if these coca crops had not existed. Therefore, the treatment variable is the presence of 
coca in all the municipalities, and the outcome variable is illegal armed activity measured as 
the activity of the groups (attacks or per capita attacks). 
 
  
Data 
The econometric exercises used different variables for 1,062 Colombian municipalities in 
1994 and 1999-2001. As stated above, econometric exercises were carried out on binary 
variables to find the probability of illegal armed activity (FARC, ELN and illegal self-defence 
groups). The available information was the number and type of activity or attack, by 
municipality and by group. This information was processed and a value of 1 was given if 
there was activity and 0 if there was not.98 
 
The variables related to the presence of armed activity were divided into five groups: illegal 
armed group activities; geographical; infrastructure; justice and eradication activities; 
economic activity and social conditions. Armed conflict variables include the dependent 
variables lagged temporally and spatially, as well as the activity of other armed groups in the 
municipality. These variables affect Pz (if the group is the same Pz falls, and if it is a different 
group Pz rises). The geographical characteristics include altitude, land aptitude, erosion, the 
presence of water,99 and the distance to the most important markets and the departmental 
capital, all of which are linked to the cost of territorial control Pz in equation (15). 
Infrastructure includes municipal roads and phone lines. The proxy variables for economic 
activity are dummy variables related to the presence of extractive economies such as oil, coal, 
emeralds and gold, as well as cattle farming, all of which are variables related to coca 
workers’ incomes Wn and those of combatants Wg. The effort of the State is expressed as 
judicial efficiency and its effect on Pz, and coca eradication ß. Finally, social conditions are 
summarized as the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (NBI) and the Gini coefficient (rural land 
concentration), both of which affect Wn and Wg.  
 
Results  
This section presents the results on the differences between cultivated hectares of coca in 
2000 in municipalities with and without the presence of illegal armed activity, for all 
Colombian municipalities and then by region. Initially the determinants of guerrilla and 
paramilitary activity were calculated for the whole of the national territory and then by 
geographical region (Orinoco and Amazon, Andean, Caribbean and Pacific). Propensity 
scores were estimated using the spatial probit methodology. In general, the models accurately 
predicted the effect of the independent variables on the probability of an attack by an illegal 
armed group. 
 
Once all the propensity scores had been calculated, the number of cultivated hectares in 
municipalities with illegal armed activity were compared with the control group of 
municipalities without this type of activity, but which have a close probability of having it. 
                                                 
98 Included actions are: extortive terrorist acts, armed confrontation, attacks on installations, planes, urban and 
rural areas, ambushes, harassment, confrontations, terrestrial piracy and massacres. 
99 All this information is from the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi. Altitude is measured as metres above 
sea level, aptitude and erosion are divided by range. Soil aptitude goes from 1 to 8, 1 being the most fertile and 8 
the least. Erosion goes from 0 to 5, 0 representing no erosion and 5 severe erosion. A weighed average was then 
calculated for soil erosion and aptitude (see Fabio Sánchez & Jairo Nuñez, ‘Lageografía y el desarrollo 
económico en Colombia: una aproximación municipal’, Desarrollo y Sociedad  46 (1999)). 
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Simple average nearest neighbour, kernel and local lineal regression methodologies were 
used, each of which produced very similar results.  
 
The same procedure was used to determine the effect of illicit crops on armed activity. In 
order to analyse the efficacy of eradication policies, the same methodology was used to 
compare municipalities where eradication had taken place with those where it had not 
(although coca was being grown). A similar level of probability was found.  
 
1. The Differences Between Cultivated Hectares of Coca as a Consequence of Illegal 
Armed Activity. 
a. Armed Actors  
The variables that determine the national and regional activities of the armed groups are 
divided into five groups: historical persistence and neighbouring activity; justice and drug 
trafficking; economic and social; geographic; and infrastructure (see Annex Table A2).100 In 
general, all the models present a good fit value and the variables have the expected signs. 
Historical persistence, geography and infrastructure positively affect armed activity, whilst 
judicial efficiency dissuades armed activities and thus has a negative coefficient. 
 
However, our interest is in determining the effect of armed activity on coca production in 
Colombia. By using matching estimators, the results shown in table 1 were obtained. In 2000, 
armed activity by at least one of the armed groups was present in 507 municipalities, and the 
difference between the average number of hectares in these municipalities and the control 
group is positive and significant. For example, according to the simple average nearest 
neighbour methodology, the average difference was 166.5 hectares. If this figure is multiplied 
by the 507 municipalities mentioned above, the total is 84,430 hectares – which means that 
about 50 percent of the total number of cultivated hectares in Colombia in 2000 was due to 
the presence of illegal armed activity. 
 
When the exercises were carried out at a regional level, the differences rose significantly, due 
to the fact that the variables that explain illegal armed activity and the coefficients obtained 
were different for each region. In Orinoco and Amazon, an average of 1,064 hectares were 
cultivated in the 59 municipalities with the presence of one of the armed groups; in the control 
groups the figure was 203.03 (using the average nearest neighbour estimator and local lineal 
regression). The number of cultivated hectares that can be attributed to the presence of armed 
actors is, therefore, 1,400 hectares. If this difference is multiplied by the number of 
municipalities in which there was illegal armed activity (59), it can be seen that 
approximately 60 percent of all cultivated hectares in 2000 in this region was due to the 
presence of armed activity. The number of cultivated hectares originating from the conflict in 
Orinoco and Amazon represent 47 percent of all coca cultivated in Colombia that year. 
 
                                                 
100 In this case a dummy variable of 1 was used if a municipality i presented illegal armed activity (FARC, ELN 
or illegal Self-defence groups) and of 0 if it did not. 
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Table 1. The Difference Between the Number of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in 
Municipalities with Illegal Armed Activity and the Control Group101 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled T NT N
Difference*No 
treated
Nation Total 
NN 166.53 57.62 *** 231.66 65.13 84431
KERNEL 129.16 57.23 ** 231.66 102.51 65483
LLR 126.58 65.43 231.66 105.08 64178
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 1401.37 530.98 *** 1604.41 203.03 82681
KERNEL 1166.57 314.67 *** 1604.41 437.84 68828
LLR 1401.37 729.20 1604.41 203.03 82681
Andean 
NN 25.01 10.90 ** 30.72 5.71 7502
KERNEL 16.17 12.35 30.72 14.55 4852
LLR 12.50 14.47 30.72 18.22 3749
Caribbean 
NN 64.06 29.88 ** 64.97 0.91 4484
KERNEL 38.34 53.69 64.97 26.63 2684
LLR 50.43 61.30 64.97 14.54 3530
Pacific
NN 116.16 46.48 ** 116.89 0.72 9177
KERNEL 95.56 37.46 ** 116.89 21.33 7549
LLR 109.36 101.08 116.89 7.53 8639
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
70 101 171
79 84 163
59 55 114
300 315 615
Standard 
Error
507 555 1062
 
 
The difference in other regions is not as great as in the south of the country, although it is still 
significant. In the Andean region, the highest difference was 25.01, which represents 7,500 
hectares in the 300 municipalities with illegal armed activity (60 percent of all coca cultivated 
in the region). Similarly, in the Caribbean region the average difference was 64.06 hectares, 
which when multiplied by the number of municipalities with illegal armed activity (70) gives 
a total of 4,500 hectares (65 percent of all coca grown in the region in 2000). Finally, in the 
Pacific region the average difference is 116.16, which when multiplied by the number of 
municipalities with illegal armed activity gives a total of 9,176 hectares (64 percent of the 
region’s total). 
 
b. FARC 
To determine the effect of FARC activities on coca crops, spatial probit models were 
estimated for municipalities and regions for 2000. The results indicate that FARC activity in 
Colombian municipalities and regions generates dependence and contagious diffusion (see 
Annex Table A3). Dependence refers to the historical presence of the FARC; contagious 
diffusion refers to the effect of FARC activities in neighbouring areas. Other variables 
affecting FARC activity are justice, distance to the most important markets (Bogotá. 
Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla), the presence of mining activities and inequalities in land 
ownership. 
                                                 
101 Difference refers to the average treatment effect on the treated, the standard error is the error obtained by 
bootstrapping, the treated average is the average number of hectares in municipalities with illegal armed activity, 
the control average is the average number of cultivated hectares once the observed variables have been taken into 
account, T is the number of treated municipalities (in this case the number of municipalities with illegal armed 
activity), NT is the number of non treated, and N is the total number of municipalities in the sample.   
  
46
 
The results of the matching estimators show that the average difference in 2000 between 
municipalities with (350) and without (712) FARC presence was, in the highest case, 219 
hectares, which is highly significant. If this value is multiplied by the number of 
municipalities with FARC presence, the total is 76,650 hectares, or 47 percent of the national 
total. 
 
 
Table 2. The Difference Between the Number of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in 
Municipalities with FARC Activity and the Control Group 
 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled
T NT N
Difference*No 
treated
Nation Total
NN 218.99 109.75 ** 326.01 107.02 76647
KERNEL 192.79 94.04 ** 326.01 133.23 67476
LLR 196.20 96.57 ** 326.01 129.81 68672
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 1624.88 618.39 *** 1911.87 286.99 79619
KERNEL 1285.15 593.60 ** 1911.87 626.73 62972
LLR 1624.88 936.53 * 1911.87 286.99 79619
Andean 
NN 28.46 18.09 37.69 9.23 5350
KERNEL 23.78 19.42 37.69 13.91 4471
LLR 21.22 16.18 37.69 16.47 3990
Caribbean 
NN 72.86 18.53 *** 74.26 1.40 3133
KERNEL 50.35 20.26 ** 74.26 23.90 2165
LLR 63.76 54.29 74.26 10.49 2742
Pacific
NN 121.03 14.07 *** 152.76 31.73 7262
KERNEL 104.11 40.12 *** 152.76 48.65 6246
LLR 121.00 81.05 152.76 31.76 7260
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
60 103 163
188 427 615
43 128 171
350 712 1062
49 55 104
Standard Error
 
 
Once again, the regional results are more convincing. In Orinoco and Amazon, the resulting 
difference using matching estimators was of 1,625 hectares. Taking into account the fact that 
49 municipalities experienced illegal FARC activity in 2000, the total value is 79,619 
hectares, or 61 percent of the regional total (see Table 2). 
 
In the Caribbean and Pacific regions, FARC presence accounts for a difference of 72.86 and 
121.03 respectively. However, in the Andean region FARC presence in 188 out of a total of 
615 municipalities is not significant enough to explain coca production in the region. 
 
c. ELN 
Table A4 shows that the probability of ELN activity in Colombian municipalities in 2000 
depended principally on spatial dynamics and the persistence and activities of other armed 
groups in the regions. The effect of the socioeconomic variables is not significant enough to 
explain the activities of this guerrilla group. 
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The effect of ELN activity on coca production is not important nor significant, as can be seen 
in Table A4. In fact, in some cases the difference is negative, although not significant. This 
implies that coca production in Colombia, as a whole, is not connected to ELN activity.  
 
Table 3. The Difference Between the Number of Cultivated Hectares of coca in 
Municipalities with ELN Activity and the Control Group 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlle
d
T NT N
Difference*No 
treated
Nation Total
NN 37.10 59.19 49.23 12.13 8867
KERNEL -29.50 33.84 49.23 78.73 -7050
LLR -34.74 39.74 49.23 83.97 -8302
Andean 
NN 46.33 18.62 ** 60.56 14.23 6671
KERNEL 39.53 19.84 ** 60.56 21.03 5692
LLR 36.13 29.48 60.56 24.43 5203
Caribbean 
NN -38.10 73.55 76.02 114.12 -1638
KERNEL -36.57 60.49 76.02 112.60 -1573
LLR -117.50 140.49 76.02 193.52 -5052
Pacific
NN 28.83 116.86 99.17 70.34 1182
KERNEL -24.44 202.42 99.17 123.61 -1002
LLR 19.67 324.80 99.17 79.50 807
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
615
128 171
41 122 163
43
144 471
Standard 
Error
239 823 1062
 
 
At the regional level, the presence of this group is a determining factor of coca production in 
the Andean region. The difference between municipalities with and without ELN activity is 
46.33. This generates a total of 6,671 hectares in 2000 (57 percent of the region’s total), 
specifically in Antioquia, Santander and Norte de Santander (see Table 3).102   
 
d. Illegal Self-Defence Groups  
Probability models were designed to determine the effect of a paramilitary presence (at a 
national and regional level) on coca crops. Orinoco and Amazon were excluded as only 8 of 
their 114 municipalities have paramilitary presence. The probability of paramilitary presence 
is positively linked to the presence of this group in neighbouring areas, to the previous 
presence of another armed group in the area, to the presence of coal and oil, to the presence of 
cattle farming and to drug-trafficking. Judicial efficiency and aerial spraying have a 
dissuasive effect on this armed group’s activities. In the regions, the most important variables 
are spatial dynamics and the previous presence of one of the other armed groups (see Annex 
Table A5). 
 
At national level, the difference between municipalities with a paramilitary presence and 
those without was positive but not significant. However, in the Andean, Caribbean and Pacific 
regions the difference was important and significant. In the Andean region, the average 
                                                 
102 The results for the other regions were unsatisfactory – in Orinoco and Amazon only 12 out of 114 
municipalities showed ELN activity. 
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number of cultivated hectares in the 97 municipalities with a paramilitary presence was 136.3 
(in the control group the value was between 16.93 and 90.84 depending on the methodology). 
The average nearest neighbour estimator generates an average difference of 119.4, which 
corresponds to a total of 11,581 hectares, or 98 percent of the regional total in 2000 
(principally in Santander, Norte de Santander and Antioquia). The difference generated by the 
LLR estimator falls to almost a third of the previous result, which means that just 30 percent 
coca production in the Andean region is due to the presence of paramilitary activity. 
 
In 2000, paramilitary groups were active in 53 municipalities in the Caribbean region, mainly 
in Cesar (14), Bolívar (12) and Magdalena (12). The average difference was positive and 
significant in all cases (between 44.61 and 74.84 hectares). Paramilitary activity, therefore, 
generated close to 45 percent of the cultivated hectares in the region in 2000. 
 
Table 4. The Difference Between the Number of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in 
Municipalities with Paramilitary Activity and the Control Group 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled T NT N
Difference*No 
treated
Nation Total
NN 123.91 168.24 128.30 4.39 23419
KERNEL 45.75 165.45 128.30 82.55 8646
LLR 48.66 99.03 128.30 79.64 9197
Andean
NN 119.40 57.20 ** 136.33 16.93 11581
KERNEL 53.32 31.40 * 136.33 83.01 5172
LLR 45.49 29.35 136.33 90.84 4413
Caribbean 
NN 74.84 42.01 * 126.06 51.22 3966
KERNEL 44.61 13.54 *** 126.06 81.45 2364
LLR 51.07 26.34 * 126.06 74.99 2706
Pacific
NN 126.31 58.49 ** 143.15 16.84 3284
KERNEL -106.59 126.67 143.15 249.74 -2771
LLR -132.24 243.38 143.15 275.39 -3438
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
1062
615
171
163
Standard 
Error
189 873
26 137
97 518
53 118
 
 
 
In the Pacific region in 2000, paramilitary forces carried out attacks in 26 municipalities, 
mainly in Cauca (11 municipalities) and Valle del Cauca (11). Average coca production in 
these municipalities was 143.15 hectares, which compared to the control group, and using the 
average nearest neighbour methodology, was equal to 126.31. If we multiply this value by the 
number of municipalities in which there was paramilitary presence, we can see that this group 
accounts for 26 percent of production. Using Kernel and LLR estimators gives negative but 
not significant results. 
 
2. Differences in Armed Activity as a Consequence of Illicit Crop Production. 
This section presents the results of econometric exercises designed to find the effect of illicit 
crops on the activities of the armed groups. The treatment variable is the presence of illicit 
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crops in a municipality. In 2000, the probability of a coca presence was determined by the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the region: poverty, inequality in land distribution, 
educational coverage, and by geographical variables: surface area, distance to the 
departmental capital, altitude, precipitation, erosion, soil and rivers (see Annex Table A6). 
Probit models were used to estimate national and regional coca presence. The outcome 
variable is the presence of illegal armed activity (a value of 1 is assigned if a municipality has 
experienced at least one attack or action by an illegal armed group, and of 0 if not). The same 
analysis was made for each one of the illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN and illegal Self-
Defence groups) and by region.  
a. FARC 
In 2000, coca was being grown in 175 Colombian municipalities. By using matching 
estimators, we were able to ascertain that there is a positive and significant difference between 
municipalities with FARC presence and the control group.103 The results show that 
approximately 47 percent of municipalities in which coca is grown also have FARC presence 
(in the control group armed activity is 28 percent) (Table 6). This 20 percent difference can be 
explained by the presence of coca. In the Orinoco and Amazon region the difference is even 
larger at 40 percent. The difference is not significant in the other regions.  
 
Table 6. The Differences Between FARC Presence in Municipalities with Coca Crops 
and the Control Group 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled
T NT N
(1) ES T P-value (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Nation Total
NN 0.19 0.05 3.508 0.000 *** 0.47 0.28
KERNEL 0.18 0.05 4.070 0.000 *** 0.47 0.28
LLR 0.20 0.04 5.262 0.000 *** 0.47 0.27
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 0.40 0.14 2.868 0.004 *** 0.70 0.30
KERNEL 0.37 0.15 2.407 0.016 ** 0.70 0.33
LLR 0.06 0.30 0.187 0.852 0.70 0.65
Andean 
NN -0.16 0.11 -1.533 0.126 0.33 0.49
KERNEL -0.16 0.10 -1.564 0.118 0.33 0.49
LLR -0.09 0.07 -1.282 0.200 0.33 0.41
Caribbean 
NN 0.28 0.27 1.046 0.296 0.44 0.16
KERNEL 0.26 0.20 1.274 0.203 0.44 0.19
LLR 0.31 0.25 1.228 0.220 0.44 0.13
Pacific
NN 0.26 0.15 1.681 0.093 * 0.38 0.12
KERNEL 0.22 0.14 1.535 0.125 0.38 0.15
LLR 0.23 0.18 1.251 0.211 0.38 0.15
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
24 139 163
54 60 114
73 542 615
25 146 171
Standard Error
175 887 1062
 
 
                                                 
103 This variable is the presence of illegal armed activity, and is given a value of 1 if there is activity and 0 if 
there is not. 
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In addition, exercises were carried out to determine the effect of illegal crops on the number 
of FARC attacks. The results for 2000 can be observed in Table A6. Municipalities with coca 
crops experienced an average of 4.2 attacks per year, whilst the value for the control group 
was 1.3. This difference can be explained by the presence of coca.104 The difference is also 
significant in the case of per capita attacks. In Orinoco and Amazon the average number of 
FARC attacks per year in municipalities with coca crops is 6.9, whilst in the control group it 
is 1.5. This difference can be explained by the presence of coca, and is significant. The 
differences persist in the other regions, and are significant in the majority of cases, although 
lower than in Orinoco and Amazon.  
b. ELN 
ELN activity in municipalities with coca crops is 22 percent higher than in municipalities with 
no coca. In the control group ELN activity is 14 percent, and in the municipalities with coca it 
is 36 percent.  
 
Table 7. The Differences Between the ELN Presence in Municipalities with Coca Crops 
and the Control Group. 
Methodology Difference Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled
T NT N
(1) ES T (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total National
NN 0.22 0.04 5.331 0.000 *** 0.36 0.14
KERNEL 0.23 0.04 5.778 0.000 *** 0.36 0.13
LLR 0.22 0.05 4.898 0.000 *** 0.36 0.14
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 0.09 0.07 1.300 0.194 0.11 0.02
KERNEL 0.09 0.04 2.072 0.038 ** 0.11 0.02
LLR 0.06 0.06 0.924 0.356 0.11 0.06
Andean 
NN 0.36 0.08 4.658 0.000 *** 0.52 0.16
KERNEL 0.35 0.07 5.012 0.000 *** 0.52 0.17
LLR 0.36 0.07 4.955 0.000 *** 0.52 0.16
Caribbean 
NN 0.41 0.14 2.886 0.004 *** 0.56 0.15
KERNEL 0.44 0.19 2.338 0.020 ** 0.56 0.12
LLR 0.37 0.17 2.189 0.029 ** 0.56 0.19
Pacific
NN 0.13 0.29 0.424 0.671 0.25 0.13
KERNEL 0.11 0.12 0.901 0.368 0.25 0.14
LLR 0.10 0.19 0.540 0.589 0.25 0.15
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
P-value
24 139
73 542
163
60 54 114
615
25 146 171
Standard Error
175 887 1062
 
 
The presence of coca has a significant effect on ELN activities in the Andean region. 36 
percent of municipalities with coca also experienced ELN activity, versus 16 percent in the 
control group. The same is true in the Caribbean region, where 56 percent of municipalities 
                                                 
104 The effect of coca on FARC activity is as follows: In 2000 there were around 1,940 FARC attacks, and coca 
explains 504 of them (2.87 attacks*175 municipalities with coca). Thus, coca was responsible for close to 26 
percent of FARC activity that year. 
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with coca crops also have ELN activity, against 16 percent in the control group. In the Pacific 
region the difference is not significant.  
 
Regarding attacks (Annex Table A7), municipalities with coca crops experienced an average 
of 2.4 ELN attacks per year, against 0.60 in the control group. This difference is statistically 
significant and is confirmed under all of the pairing methods. In the Andean region, 
municipalities with coca crops experienced 3.1 attacks, against 0.8 in the control group. In the 
Orinoco and Amazon, Caribbean and Pacific regions, the differences are not significant.  
c. Illegal Self-Defence Groups  
In the case of the paramilitary, the percentage of municipalities with this group’s presence in 
municipalities with coca crops is 39 percent, versus 10 percent in the control group. This 
difference is significant. The same is true in Orinoco and Amazon, where 19 percent of 
municipalities with coca production also have paramilitary presence, against 0 percent in the 
control group. In the Andean region the difference is 36 percent and is positive and 
significant. Finally, although a positive difference is also evident in the Pacific and Caribbean 
regions, it is not significant.  
 
Table 8. The Differences Between Paramilitary Presence in Municipalities with Coca 
Crops and the Control Group. 
Methodology Differe
nce
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled
T NT N
(1) ES T (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total National
NN 0.31 0.09 3.372 0.001 *** 0.39 0.08
KERNEL 0.29 0.10 2.933 0.003 *** 0.39 0.10
LLR 0.29 0.09 3.421 0.001 *** 0.39 0.10
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 0.19 0.11 1.680 0.093 * 0.19 0.00
KERNEL 0.16 0.09 1.817 0.070 * 0.19 0.03
LLR 0.19 0.19 0.990 0.322 0.19 0.00
Andean 
NN 0.36 0.14 2.619 0.009 *** 0.45 0.09
KERNEL 0.28 0.16 1.731 0.084 * 0.45 0.17
LLR 0.33 0.15 2.170 0.030 ** 0.45 0.13
Caribbean 
NN 0.40 0.26 1.548 0.122 0.64 0.24
KERNEL 0.41 0.29 1.391 0.164 0.64 0.23
LLR 0.49 0.54 0.898 0.369 0.64 0.15
Pacific
NN 0.38 0.22 1.709 0.088 * 0.38 0.00
KERNEL 0.31 0.26 1.216 0.224 0.38 0.06
LLR 0.38 0.27 1.377 0.169 0.38 0.00
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
Standard Error
175
73
25
P-value
146 171
139 163
887 1062
542 615
60 114
24
54
 
 
 
In terms of the number of attacks (Annex Table A8), the average over the whole country is 
0.19 in municipalities with coca crops and 0.1 in the control group. This difference Is 
significant. In the Andean region there is a significant difference between the treated group 
(0.19 attacks on average) and the control group (0.13 attacks on average). In the Pacific 
region the difference is also significant at 0.14 (0.20 in municipalities with coca and 0.06 in 
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the control group). The differences in the Caribbean and Orinoco regions are not significant 
(Table 8). 
 
3. Eradication. 
Matching estimators were used to analyse the effect of anti-drug policies in Colombia – 
specifically related to eradication via aerial spraying – and to answer the following question: 
How many hectares would have been cultivated in a municipality where aerial spraying has 
been used if the municipality had not experienced eradication? The answer indicates the effect 
of eradication on the number of cultivated hectares of coca in Colombia. The theoretic model 
presented earlier shows that eradication reduces the conflict, although its effects on 
production are undetermined. The aim of fumigation is to dissuade peasant farmers from 
cultivating coca by increasing the cost of installing and maintaining crops. However, if 
fumigation is foreseen, the farmers can over sow or move their crops to other parts of the 
same municipality, and production may increase in spite of fumigation.  
 
To determine the effects of fumigation, probability models were estimated for the presence or 
not of municipal fumigation for all municipalities with coca production during the 1999-2001 
period. The exercise was also carried out by region105. The explicative variables are 
eradication in neighbouring areas (spatial dynamics), armed activity, justice, drug-trafficking, 
and economic, social, geographical and infrastructure variables (see table A10). These models 
generated the propensity scores needed to carry out the pairing. 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, a total of 188,000 hectares in 120 of the 412 municipalities with 
illegal production were fumigated, primordially in Caquetá (31), Putumayo (19), Guaviare 
(12), Meta (12) and Nariño (11). The results show a positive difference. By multiplying the 
difference by the total number of municipalities where spraying was carried out, and 
subtracting the number of hectares eradicated, a positive result of around 24,000 hectares is 
generated. Therefore, it may be concluded that eradication policies were not successful in the 
1999-2001 period.  
 
Table 9. The Difference Between the Number of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in 
Municipalities with Eradication by Spraying and the Control Group. 
Methodology Difference
Average 
Treated
Average 
Controlled
T NT N
Difference * 
Treated (1)
Eradicated 
Hectares (2)
Net Effect (1-2)
Total National
NN 1774.46 275.80 *** 2428.36 653.90 212935 188153 24782
KERNEL 1771.92 303.71 *** 2428.36 656.44 212631 188153 24477
LLR 1528.78 429.66 *** 2428.36 899.58 183453 188153 -4700
Orinoquía and Amazonía
NN 2687.75 352.01 *** 3467.50 779.75 198894 130774 68120
KERNEL 2644.74 505.82 *** 3467.50 822.76 195711 130774 64937
LLR 2519.41 1094.02 ** 3467.50 948.09 186436 130774 55662
Andean
NN 357.10 144.01 ** 535.72 178.62 7856 25137 -17281
KERNEL 317.32 177.12 * 535.72 218.40 6981 25137 -18156
LLR 389.68 270.94 535.72 146.04 8573 25137 -16564
Pacific
NN 692.34 145.27 *** 1038.58 346.24 11770 20336 -8566
KERNEL 730.15 194.65 *** 1038.58 308.43 12413 20336 -7924
LLR 558.53 426.14 1038.58 480.05 9495 20336 -10841
*** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence
**  Significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
*   Significantly different from zero at 90% confidence
Standard 
Error
120 292 412
17 51 68
74 65 139
22 125 147
 
                                                 
105 It is important to note that the sample was restricted to municipalities that had coca crops in 1999.  
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However, looking at the results by region it can be observed that this lack of success was due 
to Orinoco and Amazon, which was the region with the highest level of coca production. In 
fact, the results show that fumigation in this region lead to an increase of more than 60,000 
hectares. Conversely, in the Andean and Pacific regions, although the differences are positive, 
the net effect on cultivated hectares is negative, and thus eradication by fumigation was 
successful in these regions (see Table 9).  
 
 
Conclusions  
Over the last two decades, Colombia has experienced sustained growth in coca production. 
From the mid-1980s, this tendency sharpened following a re-composition of cultivated 
hectares in the Andean region. Colombia thus became the region’s largest producer of coca 
leaf, ahead of the two biggest coca producers in the world (Peru and Bolivia). Colombia’s 
rising participation in the world drug market was accompanied by the strengthening of drug-
trafficking and the consolidation of the industry – initially by the Medellin, Cali and Costa 
cartels. However, the cartels were weakened during the 1990s and control of illicit drug 
production passed into the hands of illegal armed groups; this became one of their main 
sources of financing and allowed them to scale up their armed activities and increase their 
troop numbers towards the end of the decade. 
 
The analysis of spatial patterns, such as the diffusion of coca production amongst Colombian 
municipalities and illegal armed activity, shows the existence of a strong spatial relationship 
between coca production, illegal armed activity and illegal productive activity, both at the 
local level and in groups of neighbouring municipalities, that is preceded by the activities of 
the illegal armed groups. In addition, to ascertain the relationship of cause and effect between 
coca crops and the Colombian armed conflict, a non-parametric methodology known as 
matching estimators was used. This allowed us to establish the effect of illegal armed activity 
on coca production, and vice versa, by comparing municipalities with the same 
characteristics. The results show that the presence of illicit crops is closely linked to the 
presence of armed activity, as much in the case of the guerrillas as in that of the paramilitary. 
This definitively shows that one of the driving factors behind the expansion of the coca 
economy is the Colombian armed conflict. Around 70 percent of coca crops in 2000 were the 
result of the armed conflict. This shows that coca  expansion is, in fact, the result of financial 
needs that increase pari passu with the spatial scaling up and expansion of the conflict, rather 
than the other way around. These results are true both at a national and regional level. 
 
However, the conclusions are different depending on the armed group. FARC activity is 
closely linked to the greater part of national and regional coca production, especially in the 
east of the country. However, although the effect of ELN and paramilitary activity on coca 
production is positive, it is not significant throughout Colombia. A regional analysis shows 
that the activity of these groups does lead to higher production of illicit crops. In the case of 
the ELN, the positive effect is in the Andean region. Paramilitary presence increases 
production in the Andean, Caribbean and Pacific regions. These are areas in which the illegal 
armed groups’ activities and territorial control have expanded, and are also strategic points in 
the armed conflict. 
 
When determining if there was double causality between coca production and armed guerrilla 
activity, we found that coca explains part of the armed groups’ activities. Municipalities with 
coca crops have the highest presence of illegal armed groups and the highest number of 
attacks. However, coca only explains between 20 percent and 25 percent of FARC activity, 
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and even less for the other groups, although there are regional differences. This implies that 
illicit crops only make up part of the ‘gasoline’ of the conflict. 
 
These results confirm some of the hypotheses related to the economic theory of conflict, 
which argue that it is of no importance whether rebels are motivated by greed, a desire for 
power or discontent;106 what is important, however, is that rebellion be financially viable via 
illegal activities or depredation. Coca expansion in Colombia is the result of the conflict, in as 
much as it has made it financially viable. However, in contrast to natural resources or raw 
materials, where supply is fixed, coca supply depends on the strategic and territorial 
objectives of the armed groups, the scaling up of the conflict and State policies related to 
controlling production. In addition, the investigation showed that the strategy of financing the 
conflict with the proceeds of drug production can be explained by the armed groups’ 
territorial and strategic objectives. This implies that the economic theory of conflict should be 
complemented by studies that analyse the dynamics of internal conflicts or civil wars, at a 
national or regional level, to better understand the financial strategies, economic motivations 
and objectives of irregular forces. Therefore, the results of the paper are very much in line 
with the DiJohn’s argument, which states that origin and dynamics of civil conflict depend 
upon the political or strategic aims of the confronting groups.107 What a particular natural 
resources does (coca) is to facilitate the prolongation and intensification of the conflict. 
 
The war on illicit crops has used a three pronged approach: manual eradication, crop 
substitution and eradication via chemical spraying (the most used method being aerial 
spraying, which has intensified in the south of the country since the mid-1990s). To analyse 
the efficiency of this policy, the same methodology was used as that used to study the effect 
of armed actors on coca production. We found that rather than reducing coca cultivation, the 
fumigation policies that were carried out between 1999 and 2001 caused it to rise, especially 
in the Orinoco and Amazon region. The opposite was true in the Pacific and Andean regions.  
                                                 
106 Collier (2000). 
107 DiJohn (2002). 
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Annexes 
Graphs  
 
Graph A1. The distribution of coca production in the Orinoco and Amazon regions. 
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Source: National Drugs Department, Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table A1.  Aerial spraying of coca by department, 1994-2001(hectares). 
Departament 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Antioquia 684 4434 183
Bolivar 11398
Boyaca 221
Caqueta 537 4370 18433 15656 9508 15647
Cauca 2713 3378 1917
Cordoba 349 1826
Cundinamarca 44
Guaviare 3142 21394 14425 30192 37081 17376 8450 7236
Meta 729 2471 2524 6725 5920 2296 1136 4115
Nariño 6349 8366
Norte de Santander 9799 10308
Putumayo 574 3949 4980 12645 32784
Santander 283
Vaupes 349
Vichada 50 297 91 2199
Total 3871 23915 18519 41861 66029 43111 58074 94153   
Source: Environmental Audit: Illicit Crop Programme 
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Table A2.  Determinants of illegal activities 2000. 
Dependent Variable
Region
Variables
Constant -3.411 *** -0.203 -3.915 *** -5.358 *** -5.352 ***
Armed Groups 
Illegal Armed Group Activity 1999 0.826 *** 0.841 *** 0.824 *** 1.036 *** 1.008 ***
Illegal Armed Group Activity 1998 0.364 *** 0.290 ** 0.494 * 0.809 ***
Illegal Armed Group Activity 1997 0.432 *** 0.437 *** 0.812 *** 0.111
Justice and Drug Trafficking 
Justice Efficiency 1999 -0.805 *** -0.588 * 4.509 ** -0.894
Social and Economic
Gold Production 0.357 *** 0.370 ** -0.461 1.026 ***
Cattle Activity 0.018 0.128 -0.249 0.666 **
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 0.002 0.012 *** 0.013 -0.011 *
Gini of Private Property 1999 -2.730 ***
Educational Coverage -3.064 ***
Geographical Variables
Altitude 0.180 *** 0.179 *** 0.149 0.240 ***
Distance to the four Principal Markets 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 ***
Infrastructure Variables
Roads 0.081 *** 0.132 *** 0.101 0.131
Phones Lines 0.039 ** 0.087 * 0.006 0.038 0.057
Estimation Method: 
No Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood
Nation Total Orinoquía y 
Amazonía
Andean Caribbean Pacífica
Armed Groups 2000
Coefficient
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
0.3258
1062 114 615 171
0.3897
163
0.241
-557.25652 -55.57793 -324.85 -78.001 -68.9101
0.296 0.2376
 
 
Table A3.  Determinants of FARC Activity in 2000  
Dependent Variable= FARC 2000
Region
Variables
Constant -2.434 *** -2.408 ** -2.344 ** -2.960 *** 7.227
Spatial Dynamic 
FARC's neighbor activity in 2000 0.059 *** 2.322 *** 0.877 *** 1.611 *** 0.874 *
Armed Groups
FARC's activity 1999 0.822 *** 1.212 *** 0.655 *** 0.215 0.965 ***
FARC's activity 1998 0.429 *** 0.418 0.350 ** 1.046 *** 0.468
FARC's activity 1997 0.524 *** 0.577 ***
Interaction between FARC and Self-Defense Groups  1999 0.324
ELN's activity 1999 (Dummy) 0.364 0.170
Self Defense Groups activity 1999 (Dummy) 0.703 *** 0.350
Justice and Drug Trafficking 
Justice Efficiency 1999 -0.710 **
Justice Efficiency against Drug Trafficking 2000 -2.370
Aerial Eradication 1999 0.000 0.946 **
Social and Economic
Coal Production 0.352 ** 0.330 *
Oil Production -0.176
Participation in the nation current income  (per cápita) -1.038 **
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 0.002
Gini of Private Property 2000 1.301 ** 1.835 * 1.786 ** 3.368 **
Gini of Private Property 2001 (neighbors) -2.233 *** -2.348 **
Educational Coverage -0.507 -1.905 ***
Geographical Variables
Altitude 0.108 *** 0.090 -0.036
Distance to the Capital -0.001 -0.002
Distance to the four Principal Markets 0.001 ** 0.000 0.002 *
Infrastructure Variables
Roads 0.124 *** 0.160 *** 0.112
Phones Lines
Estimation Method: 
No Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood
PROBIT PROBIT
1062
-506.9 -41.3674
104
0.247 0.4248
Coefficient Coefficient
Nation Total Orinoquía and 
Amazonía
Andean Caribbean
-67.8223
615 171
-295.5755 -59.79868
163
0.2193 0.3799 0.3676
Pacífic
Coefficient
PROBIT
Coefficient Coefficient
PROBIT PTOBIT
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Table A4.  Determinants of ELN activity 2000 
Dependent Variable= FARC 2000
Region
Variables
Constant -4.740 *** -4.021 *** -6.704 *** -5.835 ***
Spatial Dynamic 
ELN's neighbor activity in 2000 1.772 *** 2.516 *** 0.615 0.942
Armed Actors
ELN's activity 1999 (dummy) 0.591 *** 0.524 ** 0.885 ** 0.842 *
ELN's activity 1998 (dummy) 0.321 ** 0.410 ** 1.131 *** 0.799 **
ELN's activity 1997 (dummy) 0.668 ***
FARC's activity 1999 (dummy) 0.267 ** 0.312 **
FARC's activity 1998 (dummy) -0.080
Self Defense Groups activity 1999 (Dummy) 0.583 *** 0.574 *** 0.719 ** 0.926 ***
Justice and Drug Trafficking 
Justice Efficiency 1999 0.016
Justice Efficiency against Drug Trafficking 1999 3.292
Drug Trafficking Income -0.526
Social and Economic
Coal Production 0.104 1.777
Oil Production -0.146
Gold Production 0.150
Cattle Activity 0.491
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 0.002 0.025 ***
Gini of Private Property 2000 0.862 1.085
Geographical Variables
Altitude 0.143 *** 0.174 ** 0.348 *** 0.000 ***
Distance to the Capital 0.000 0.002 *
Distance to the four Principal Markets 0.001 0.006 **
Infrastructure Variables
Roads 0.107 *** 0.003 ** 0.190 *
Estimation Method: 
No Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood
ELN 2000
Nation Total Andean Caribbean Pacífic
ELN 2000 ELN 2000 ELN 2000
615 171
Coefficient
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
163
0.3934
-343.5108 -200.201 -60.079 -56.8944
0.4019 0.377 0.3811
1062
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Table A5.  Determinants of paramilitary activity 2000 
Dependent Variable
Region
Variables
Constant -1.891 ** -2.817 *** -2.806 ** -1.276 **
Spatial Dynamic 
Illegal Self Defense Groups 2000 (neighbors) 0.799 ** 0.947 *
Armed Groups 
Illegal Self Defense Group's activity 1999 (dummy) -0.018 0.445 ** 0.176 ** 0.374 **
Illegal Self Defense Group's activity 1998 (dummy) 0.443 *** 0.448 **
Illegal Self Defense Group's activity 1997 (dummy) 0.273 **
Self Defense Group - FARC interaction 1999 0.357 *
Self Defense Group - ELN interaction 2000 0.554 ***
FARC's activity 1999 (dummy) 0.124 ** 0.449 ** 0.169 **
Actividad del ELN 1999 (Dummie) 1.083 **
Justice and Drug Trafficking 
Justice Efficiency 1999 -0.897 * -1.700 ** 7.230 **
Social and Economic
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 -0.016 *** -0.013 ** -0.028 **
Gini of Private Property 1999 -3.346 **
Geographical Variables
Altitude -0.090 *
Distance to the Capital -0.001 -0.004 **
Distance to the four Principal Markets 0.001 -0.006 **
Infrastructure Variables
Roads 0.110 ** 0.153 ** 0.386 **
Phones Lines 0.069 *** 0.053 * 0.107 ** 0.156 **
Estimation Method: 
No Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood
Autodefensas 
2000
Nation Total Andean Caribbean Pacífic
Autodefensas 
2000
Autodefensas 
2000
Autodefensas 
2000
615 171
Coefficient
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
163
0.2815
-269.1407 -155.89 -42.2587 -37.3428
0.2159 0.4457 0.4211
1062
 
 
Table A6. Determinants of the Ilicit Crops 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant -2.024*** -5.419 -4.875*** 7.029** -5.582*
Social and Economics
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 0.141*** 0.039*** 0.130** -0.006 0.146
Gini of private property 2000 -2.203*** -1.970** -1.505** -2.352 -2.278
Education -1.083** -0.415 -2.040** 2.237 -1.396
Geographical Variables
Altitude -0.0003*** -0.002** -0.006 -0.001* 0.009
Distance to the capital 0.001*** -0.008 -0.001 0.002* 0.005***
Distance to the tour Principal Markerts -0.0001 -0.002 0.003* -0.011* 0.004*
Precipitation -0.0003 -0.001** 0.007 0.003 -0.005**
Water disponibility index 0.0005*** 0.001** 0.008*** -0.007* 0.009
Erosion 0.2443*** 0.153*** 0.373*** 0.191 -0.012
Soil aptitude Index -0.0791 -0.029 -0.102 -0.339* 0.135
Infraestructure variables
Roads -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.005* -5.582*
Estimation Method: 
No de Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood -32.41-359.7555 -41.84 -155.92 -41.1572
163
0.243 0.4694 0.3041 0.4215 0.5242
1062 114 615 171
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Total National Orinoquía y Amazon Andiean Caribean Pacific
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Table A7. Differences in FARC activity (number of attacks) as the result of illicit drug 
production in 2000 
 
 
Table A8.  Differences in ELN activity (number of attacks) as the result of illicit drug 
production in 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology Difference Average 
Treated
Average 
Controls
T NT N 
(1) ES T P-value (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total National
NN 1.78 0.49 3.655 0.000*** 2.42 0.63
KERNEL 1.91 0.49 3.872 0.000*** 2.42 0.51
LLR 1.85 0.47 3.956 0.000*** 2.42 0.56
Orinoquía y Amazon
NN 1.50 0.88 1.713 0.087*** 1.69 0.18
KERNEL 2.14 1.92 1.117 0.264 1.69 -0.45
LLR 1.37 1.13 1.211 0.226 1.69 0.31
Andean
NN 2.23 0.86 2.589 0.010*** 3.08 0.85
KERNEL 2.22 0.84 2.631 0.009*** 3.08 0.87
LLR 2.14 0.96 2.235 0.026** 3.08 0.94
Caribbean
NN 2.14 1.54 1.393 0.164 3.24 1.10
KERNEL 2.54 2.92 0.868 0.358 3.24 0.70
LLR 1.70 2.56 0.663 0.508 3.24 1.54
Pacific
NN 0.72 0.84 0.851 0.395 1.21 0.49
KERNEL 0.76 1.54 0.494 0.621 1.21 0.45
LLR 0.64 1.34 0.481 0.631 1.21 0.56
*** Significant at 99 
percent ** Significant at 95 
percent * Sig ificant at 90 
percent 
Standard Error 
175 887 1062
54 60 114
73 542 615
25 146 171
24 139 163
Constant -2.024*** -5.419 -4.875*** 7.029** -5.582*
Social and Economics
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 2000 0.141*** 0.039*** 0.130** -0.006 0.146
Gini of private property 2000 -2.203*** -1.970** -1.505** -2.352 -2.278
Educatio n -1.083** -0.415 -2.040** 2.237 -1.396
Geographical Variables
Altitude -0.0003*** -0.002** -0.006 -0.001* 0.009
Distance to the capital 0.001*** -0.008 -0.001 0.002* 0.005***
Distance to the tour Principal Markerts -0.0001 -0.002 0.003* -0.011* 0.004*
Precipitation -0.0003 -0.001** 0.007 0.003 -0.005**
Water disponibility index 0.0005*** 0.001** 0.008*** -0.007* 0.009
Erosion 0.2443*** 0.153*** 0.373*** 0.191 -0.012
Soil aptitude Index -0.0791 -0.029 -0.102 -0.339* 0.135
Infraestructure variables
Roads -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.005* -5.582*
Estimation Method: 
No de Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood -32.41-359.7555 -41.84 -155.92 -41.1572
163
0.243 0.4694 0.3041 0.4215 0.5242
1062 114 615 171
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Total National Orinoquía y Amazon Andiean Caribean Pacific
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Table A9.  Differences in delinquent activity (number of attacks) as the result of illicit 
drug production 1999-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9.  Determinants of eradication via spraying 2000 
 
 
Table A8.  Differences in delinquent activity (number of attacks) as the result of illicit 
drug production 1999-2003 
 
Table A8.  Differences in delinquent activity (number of attacks) as the result of illicit 
drug production 1999-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology Difference Average   
Treated 
Average   
Control T NT N 
(1) SE T P-value (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total National 
NN 0.09 0.02 3.679 0.000 *** 0.19 0.10 
KERNEL 0.08 0.02 3.715 0.000 *** 0.19 0.11 
LLR 0.07 0.02 4.200 0.000 *** 0.19 0.11 
Orinoquía y Amazon 
NN 0.03 0.06 0.453 0.651 0.13 0.10 
KERNEL 0.02 0.05 0.428 0.669 0.13 0.11 
LLR 0.02 0.08 0.273 0.785 0.13 0.11 
Andean 
NN 0.06 0.03 1.847 0.065 * 0.19 0.13 
KERNEL 0.06 0.03 1.945 0.052 * 0.19 0.13 
LLR 0.07 0.04 1.719 0.086 * 0.19 0.13 
Caribbean 
NN -0.12 0.13 -0.939 0.348 0.32 0.44 
KERNEL -0.01 0.13 -0.075 0.940 0.32 0.33 
LLR -0.13 0.20 -0.655 0.513 0.32 0.45 
Pacific 
NN 0.14 0.05 2.748 0.006 *** 0.20 0.06 
KERNEL 0.14 0.05 2.800 0.005 *** 0.20 0.06 
LLR 0.14 0.04 3.316 0.001 *** 0.20 0.06 
*** Significant  at 99% 
** Significant at 95% 
* Significant at 90% 
Standard Error 
175 887 1062 
54 60 114 
73 542 615 
25 146 171 
24 139 163 
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Table A10.  Determinants of Aerial  Erradication 1999-2001 
 
 
 
 
Theoretic Model 
Case 3. Changing the probability of eradication  
 
 
 
 
In contrast to the previous case: an increased probability of eradication leads to increased 
levels of territorial control and guerrilla numbers.  
·
tg = 0
tg
tz
*tz
tg *
·
tz = 0
tg *’
*tz ’
·
tz ’= 0
·
tg ’= 0
Dependent Variable
Region
Variables
Constant -1.726* -2.280*** 0.287 *** 1.091 *** -5.071***
Spatial Dynamic 
Aerial Eradication (neighbors) 4.333 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Actores Armados
FARC's activity 1997-1999 0.058 *** -0.299*** 0.83 *** 
ELN's activity 1997-2000 -0.015 *** -1.547***
Illegal Self Defense Group's activity 1997-1999 0.534 *** 0.335 ***
Justice and Drug Trafficking 
Aerial Eradication 1999 / 1998-2000 1.117 0.866 *** 0.941 *** 0.068 *** 2.509 ***
Aerial Eradication 1997-1999 0.740 *** 0.725 ***
Social and Economic
Index of Basic Unsatisfied Needs 1998-2000 0.018 ** 0.007 *** 0.000 *** 0.004 ***
Gini of Private Property 1998-2000 -0.348 *** -2.611***
Educational Coverage -2.570**
Geographical Variables
Soil Aptitude -0.250**
Height (mt above the sea level) -0.051*** -0.182 *** -0.104***
Erosion 0.123 ***
Distance to the Capital 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Distance to the four Principal Markets 0.000 *** -0.001 *** -0.002*** 0.008 ***
Infrastructure Variables
Roads 0.065 ***
Phones Lines 0.095 * -0.011*** 
Estimation Method: 
No Observations
Pseudo R2
loglikelihood
Eradication 
1999-2001
Nation Total Nation Total Andean Pacific
Eradication 
1999-2001
Orinoquía and 
Amazonía
Eradication 
1999-2001
Eradication 
1999-2001
Eradication 
1999-2001
173 412 147
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT
Coefficient
PROBIT
-22.834
0.3352
139
-56.299
0.4028
68
0.503
-84.74 -165.24406 -54.6
0.4139 0.12
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Similar to the first case, increased probability of eradication leads to increased levels of 
territorial control and fewer guerrillas.  
 
 
 
Case 4. Changes in the costs of territorial control  
 
 
 
The rising cost of territorial control leads to more territorial control and to a reduction in the 
number of active guerrillas. 
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The rising cost of territorial control leads to more territorial control and to a reduction in the  
number of active guerrillas. 
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